

An Answer to a late Pamphlet,

ENTITUL'D

Obedience and Submission to the Present Government,
Demonstrated from B^p. OVERALL'S Convocation-Book.

WITH

A POSCRIPT in Answer to Dr. SHERLOCK'S
Case of Allegiance.

TH E Author for Introduction begins with charging the Non-Swearers with *Malice* or *Ignorance*, for reproaching those of the Church of *England*, who have taken the Oaths, with deserting their Principles.

Perhaps the Author thinks it a very *malicious* Thing in them, to be deprived of their Livings and Preferments, (for what other Instances of *Malice* they have been guilty of I cannot devise.) Well, it was spitefully done of them to lose their Livelihoods, and in such a reflecting manner, to reproach those who swore, and kept or advanced theirs: Whereas they might have taken the Oaths, and if they could not with a good Conscience, at least they ought to have done so, to save the Reputation of their Brethren. The other Branch of the Charge is *Ignorance*, and if by that the Author means, That they do not know, but those have deserted their Principles, for my part, I confess the Fact, I am thus ignorant, and I wonder when we shall be better inform'd. They have often been called upon to shew the Consistency of their present Practices, either with the General Principles of the Church of *England*, or with their own Principles heretofore, but they will not vouchsafe

to do it. And for any thing this Author, or any other hath said, we are still like to be kept in Ignorance.

We confess plainly, we have not Skill to reconcile them, and we want their help, and if they will not afford it us, and reconcile them themselves, whose Fault it is? 'Tis true, they are not sparing of Arguments, taken out of *Parsons* the Jesuite, and from the *Rebels* in the Year 42. and from the Advocates of *Cromwell's* Usurpation. These we meet with in every Pamphlet, but we hope we may be pardon'd, if we do not take these for Principles of the Church of *England*, and a Man may look his Eyes out, before he can find any other; and this Author is the first that ever pretended to produce any publick Act of the Church of *England* in favour of such Practices, and how fairly he hath done it, we shall see by and by.

In the mean time, if what he alledges from thence were true, (as it is not,) it will by no means justify them; for it is at best but a pretence taken up after the Fact. And as a subsequent Law cannot condemn, so neither can it justify a Fact previous to it. And I presume there is not one single Person, but what had taken the Oath, either before the publication of the *Convocation-Book*, or without any respect to it: So that
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whatever the Sense or Authority of that Convocation may be, it signifies nothing to justify or excuse the Proceedings of those who knew nothing of it, nor acted with any manner of reference to it. Let them shew any other publick Act of the Church, any Opinion of one of the approv'd Sons of the Church of *England*, the Practice of any one that own'd her Principles, in favour of the Doctrines they now teach, and the Practices they now follow, and then they say something: But in vain do they pretend to justify themselves from a *Convocation-Book*, when they had done the Fact before they ever heard of, or saw the Book they pretend to justify themselves by. This Author talks of *Demonstration* from this Book, but it concerns him, and others that call themselves of the Church of *England*, to demonstrate it from something else, or they can never satisfy their Consciences, that they have acted in Conformity to the Principles of the Church of *England*; for those who had done the Business long before, can never shelter themselves by any Proofs taken from this Book, if any such there be; and whether there are or no, we come now to examine.

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The Authour says, *That he lays down the Doctrine about Government and Allegiance in four Propositions, extracted out of the Convocation-Book, to which almost the whole Controversie may be reduc'd.*

And they are these:

1. *That the Power of Kings was originally Patriarchal, Derived from God, and not from the People.*
2. *That Descent, in Hereditary Kingdoms, is the Ordinary way whereby a Right and Title to the Crown is claimable.*
3. *That no Violence is to be used to Kings from their own Subjects, for any Irregularities they commit.*
4. *That having Sworn Allegiance to a Prince, we cannot, without the dread-*

ful Guilt of Perjury transfer our Allegiance, whilst he continues to have an Authoritative Right and Title to the Crown.

Now 'tis to be remember'd, that the Authour saith, that these four Propositions are extracted out of the Convocation Book. I suppose he does not mean, That they are all there, in so many Words, (for that is not so;) but that he hath in them delivered the sense of the Convocation about Government and Allegiance; and whether he hath faithfully done so, is the subject of the present Enquiry. And I shall shew, and (since the Author is delighted with the word) *demonstrate*, That he hath omitted many things that are material, and pertinent to the present Controversie about Government and Allegiance. That what he hath drawn up into these Propositions, he hath in some of them (if not in all) curtail'd and diminish'd the full sense of the Convocation. That, above all, by adding words and Limitations, and Glosses, and Explications, he hath destroyed the Text, and perfectly corrupted and perverted their Sense: I shall shew this in examining the particulars.

The first Proposition I shall examine last, because the Authour builds upon it, and says, *it is the Ground-work of the whole Discourse*, and gives occasion for Enquiry into it afterwards.

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The second Proposition is thus in the Authour: *That Descent, in Hereditary Kingdoms, is the ordinary way whereby a Right and Title to the Crown is claimable.* And that we may be sure not to mistake him, he adds, *I say, is the Ordinary way*: But I say, that Ordinary way is his own, and not in that Text, nor can be made out in the sense of the Authour: For though there may be some extraordinary ways in hereditary Kingdoms, that may give a Right and Title to the Crown, besides Descent, as God's

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God's particular Nomination and Appointment, the Extinction or Submission of the Right Heirs. Yet the Authour's extraordinary way is none of them: For though in explaining this Proposition he tells us, (according to the Convocation,) that the Lord may and is able to overthrow Kings, notwithstanding any Claim, Right, Title, or Interest, that they can challenge to their Kingdoms; yet if he be consistent to himself, by all this he means only God's permissive Providence, in permitting another Person to take Possession of the Crown: And then I say again, that this is not the Sense of the Convocation, but the contrary; and let any Man read the seventeenth Canon of the first Book, and he will soon be satisfied. *If any Man shall affirm, That the Kingdom of Judah by God's Ordinance going by Succession, when one King was dead, his Heir was not in Right their King, (howbeit by some Athaliah he might be hindered from enjoying it,) or that the People were not bound without any farther circumstance, upon sufficient notice of their former King's death, to have obeyed his Heir apparent, as their Lawful King, he doth greatly err.*

From whence there is nothing more plain, than that the sense of the Convocation is, that notwithstanding any Usurped Possession of the Crown, and such as Athaliah's was, (which continued some Years,) the People were bound to pay Obedience to the right Heir, as their lawful King. And then I wonder what becomes of Possession, and permissive Providence: And before the Authour can demonstrate otherwise, he must first demonstrate this Canon, and a great many other things out of the Book. But of this more hereafter.

The third Proposition is, *That no Violence is to be used to Kings for any Irregularities that they commit.* This does not fully express the Sense of the Convocation, but the Authour's Comment

destroys it. The Authour, in explaining or proving this Proposition, says, *For the Doctrine of Passive Obedience to a Government established by Law, (then by the way, there is no Passive Obedience due to a Government not established by Law,) whether the Prince be limited, and sworn to govern by Laws chosen by the People, and enacted with his Consent, or the Prince be absolute, and his will sufficiently declared, be the Law, is of absolute necessity to the Support of any Government.* From whence, it seems, that the Authour hath got Mr. Johnson's Passive Obedience, and limits it to the Laws, and not to the Prince: And if so, this is not only a plain Contradiction to the Convocation, but to his own extracted Proposition; for that is, *That Kings are to receive no Violence from their Subjects for any Irregularities they commit.* Now though Irregularities is a fine word, and not in the Convocation, yet I suppose the Authour does not mean less by it, than a Prince acting and governing against Law, especially joyned with that Universal, *for any Irregularities they commit.* And then I assume, that Passive Obedience is due to a lawful Prince, notwithstanding, and upon his acting and governing against Law. And this I am sure is the Sense of the Convocation; and if the Authour cannot tell how to extract this Proposition, I have been so civil as to extract it for him.

The fourth Proposition is, *That having sworn Allegiance to a Prince, we cannot, without the dreadful Guilt of Perjury, transfer our Allegiance, whilst he continues to have an Authoritative Right and Title to the Crown.* Now I would gladly know, from what place of the Convocation-Book this Proposition is extracted. The Print refers us to Canon 36. but there is nothing in that Canon of Oaths or Allegiance, and therefore that I suppose is the Error of the Press, and it should be Can. 30.

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where there is something of it, but not one word of the Authour's Limitation of the Continuance of an Authoritative Right and Title, but the contrary. Jadus, when Alexander (having overthrown Darius) sent to him to assist him in his wars, and become Tributary to the Macedonians, as he had been to the Persians; return'd for Answer, That he might not yield thereto, because he had taken an Oath for his true Allegiance to Darius, which he might not lawfully violate whilst Darius liv'd. Now I suppose that whilst Darius lived, is not whilst he continued to have an authoritative Right and Title, and he must have an extraordinary Faculty at Demonstration, that can demonstrate them to be the same; and besides, the Convocation supposes that Darius had not at that time that Authoritative Title the Authour mentions; for they tell us expressly, that this was when Darius was escaped by flight, after his Army was discomfited: Add therefore once again I desire the Favour, that the Authour would tell me, where he had this Authoritative Right and Title; for there is not one word of it in the Convocation Book, nor any thing like it. I know the Authour is resolved to have it, and therefore presently adds, *I say Authoritative Right and Title.* Well the Authour may say what he please, what is that to me, or to the Business? The Question is not what the Authour says, but what the Convocation says. The Authour perhaps may think it better to transfer his Allegiance to any Power, than to be bound up by his Oath; and if he like it, he may enjoy his own humour; but then let him not father this upon the Convocation, and make them say what they never intended, nor thought on. The Authour goes on, *The Case may so happen, that these being separated, the Claim of Right, without the Authority, cannot challenge our Allegiance.* The contrary to which is as expressly delivered and asserted by the

P. 5.

Ibid.

Convocation, as any thing can be, as in the Case of Joash and Athaliah, (Chap. and Can. 23.) where, notwithstanding Joash had none of our Authour's Authoritative Right and Title, and had only Claim of Right, without the Authority, "Yet when Jehoiada called the People together, and being acquainted with the Preservation of their Prince, they all together by a Covenant acknowledged their Allegiance to him, as unto their lawful King; and in consequence of that slew Athaliah the Usurper. And the Convocation adds, That "In all the process of which action nothing was done which God himself did not require at their Hands; and the Reason of this they give, Joash, their late King's Son, being then their only natural Lord and Sovereign, although Athaliah kept him for six Years from the possession of his Kingdom. P. 41:42.

This is plain enough, and needs no farther insisting on; and what Opinion soever our Authour may have of his own Notion, That the Claim of Right, without the Authority, cannot challenge Allegiance: Yet I hope he will hereafter be careful how he ascribes it to the Convocation. I am contented to own with the Authour, That the Case may so happen, that Authority (in the Authour's Sense) and Right may be separated; but the Question is, whether Allegiance may be separated from Right and transferred to Authority without Right. That the Authour does, but the Convocation never asserted: It is plain in the foregoing Instance, That, according to the Convocation, Right without Authority may and ought to challenge Allegiance; and it is as plain from the same and other Instances, that Authority without Right cannot challenge it. There are indeed some Instances of transferring Allegiance, mentioned and justified in the Convocation Book; and our Authour, and some others, presently conclude from thence, That

That they justify paying and transferring Allegiance to any Person possessed of Power, though without Right, nay, against it. And this is a fundamental Mistake, and arises for want of considering, That in these Cases the Convocation never requires, nor justifies the transferring Allegiance, but only where the Right is transferred likewise. Thus in the Case of *Jehu*, the Convocation expressly asserts, That *Jehu* was the lawful King, and *Joash* was then his Subject; (i. e.) the Right was in *Jehu*, and not in *Joash*. So also of *Abud*, when he was authorised to kill the King of *Eglon*; he was first made a Judge, Prince, and Ruler, and the Convocation says expressly, That "It is not lawful for any Person whatsoever, upon pretence of any Revelation, Inspiration, or Commandment from God, either to touch the Person of his Sovereign, or to bear Arms against him, except God should first advance the said Person from his private Estate, and make him a King. So that 'tis plain, in the sense of the Convocation, there was first a Right before Allegiance became due, and they challeng'd Allegiance only by virtue of that Right. And the same may be said of their Submission and Obedience to the *Babylonians*, the *Persians*, *Macedonians* and the *Romans*, all mentioned and justified by the Convocation-Book, these respective Governments had a Right of Government over the *Jews*, though not in the same manner with the former by God's express Nomination, yet they acquired a Right by the Submission and acknowledgment of those, in whom the Right was; And for the Proof of this I shall look no farther than our Authour, who tells us expressly (pag. 8, 9.) That the Kings of Israel and Judah became not only Tributary but Subjects to the Kings of Babylon. And then I wonder what the Authour means by saying upon this Proposition, (pag. 5.) That the Claim of Right without the

Authority cannot challenge Allegiance, as in the Case of the Kings of Israel and Judah, that were led Captive by the Babylonians, who they survived in Babylon, and some of them out of Confinement. For what if they did survive, and whether they were in, or out of Confinement, yet, being Subjects, what claim of Right had they? And the Authour himself says, that, being Subjects, whatever other duty might, yet Allegiance could no way be due to them; and what Right soever they might have before, by becoming Subjects, they had transferred it to the King whose Subjects they were; and that with the Submission of the People I hope was sufficient to make a Right in those Princes to that Government, and in consequence of that Right to make Allegiance to become due: So that however the Authour may contradict himself, it is plain in all the Instances the Convocation mentions and justifies, Allegiance followed Right, and not merely Possession, or (as our Authour calls it) Authority.

It is objected from *Josephus*, (L. II. C. 8.) That (whatever he might answer) *Jaddus* actually became a Subject to *Alexander* while *Darius* was alive, and also before he was totally and finally subdued: For *Josephus* tells us, that after the taking of *Tyre*, *Alexander* being displeased with *Jaddus's* Answer, came directly to *Jerusalem*, upon whose approach *Jaddus* in his Pontifical Attire meets him, and submits to him, and *Alexander*, instead of executing his revenge, falls down before him, as having in a Vision at *Dio* seen a Person so attired, &c.

To this I answer,

I. That the Story it self is very suspicious.

II. If it were true, it would not prove what it is alledged for.

I. The

I. The Story is very suspicious, upon these two Accounts :

1. No Authour, besides *Josephus*, and those that had it from him, mentions or takes notice of any such thing. There is not the least footstep of it in *Diodorus Siculus*, or *Plutarch*, or *Quintus Curtius*, or *Arian*, or *Justin*, all very good and diligent Historians; and (to say the Truth of them) every one of them a more creditable Authour than *Josephus*. *Diodorus Siculus* was much nearer the time, and wrote 160 years before *Josephus*, and each of them gives a punctual account of the whole Progress of *Alexander*, and yet not one word of *Jaddus*, or *Jerusalem*. Now if it were true, as *Josephus* records, it is as memorable a passage as any in the whole Expedition; and it is a strange thing, that those who are so punctual as to tell us of his wanting Sleep, of his Dreams, and of his taking Physick, should yet pretermitt, and silently pass over a thing every way so remarkable. And what is yet more strange, if *Josephus* be in the right, they tell us the clean contrary, viz. That from the Siege of *Tyre*, *Alexander* went directly to *Gaza*, and so on into *Egypt*, to the Temple of *Jupiter Hamon*, and so from place to place, till he came to *Gangomela*, where he fought the last Battel with *Darius*.

2. The Difficulty of reconciling it with Chronology. *Josephus* tells us, That *Manasses* the younger Brother of *Jaddus*, Married the Daughter of *Sanballat*, and for which *Jaddus* deposed him from the Priesthood, and *Sanballat* for to encourage him, by leave obtained from *Alexander*, built a Temple in *Samaria*, and made *Manasses* High-Priest. Now *Sanballat* was Prefect of *Syria*, and Governor of the Samaritans, when *Nehemiah* built the Walls of *Jerusalem*, and disturbed the Building, &c. This was

the 20th Year of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*. Now from the 20th Year of *Artaxerxes*, to the taking of *Tyre*, is 115 Years, and it is thus computed :

	Years.
<i>Artaxerxes Longimanus</i> reigned	41
<i>Darius Nothus</i>	19
<i>Artaxerxes Mnemon</i>	43
<i>Ochus</i>	23
<i>Arses</i>	3
<i>Darius Codomanus</i>	6
	<hr/> 135

From which subtract 20 of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, and there remains 115. Now as *Calvisius* observes, the Government of *Syria* and *Samaria*, being a Place of great Authority and Trust, *Sanballat*, when the Government was conferred upon him, could not be a young Man, but of good Years and Experience; and the least we can suppose him to be at the beginning of his Government, (and how long that might be before *Nehemiah's* going up to *Jerusalem*, the Scripture is silent; but it is certain, that it was before,) is of the Age of 30. And add this to the former Account,

115
30

145

And then *Sanballat* at that time must be One hundred forty and five years old.

And it is to be observ'd, that this is the shortest Computation, and I believe the truest. Those who reckon *Sogdianus*, and a second *Xerxes*, as Kings of *Persia*, make it yet longer. And *Jaddus* and *Manasses* could not be much younger: For that *Nehemiah* (Ch. 13. ver. 21.) takes notice of this Marriage with the Daughter of *Sanballat*, and (Ch. 12. ver. 22.) intimates *Jaddus's* then being High-Priest. Now *Brietius* tells us, That *Nehemiah* dyed the last Year

Annal. ad Year of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, and
An. Mun. from the Death of *Artaxerxes*, to the
 3629. taking of *Tyre*, as appears by the Com-
 putation, is 94 Years. Now how long
Nehemiah wrote his Book before he
 dy'd does not appear; nor is it certain
 how old *Jaddus* and *Manasses* then were
 But it is plain, That *Manasses*, the
 younger Brother, was then married;
 and 'tis probable *Jaddus* was then High-
 Priest, and I think the least we can al-
 low for the time of *Nehemiah's* Living,
 after he ended his Book, and for the
 marriageable Age of *Manasses*, and then
 for *Jaddus's* Age, as elder than him,
 the least we can allow is 30 Years,
 and it is very probable it was much
 more. To this add 94, the former
 Computation, and then *Jaddus*, at that
 time *Josephus* fastens this Story, must
 have been 124 Years old.

And this is the least and lowest ac-
 count: But if we take *Josephus* his
 Computation, it will be yet much lon-
 ger; for he tells us *Nehemiah* built the
 Walls of *Jerusalem* the 28th Year of
Xerxes, and dyed some time after.
 And then from the Death of *Xerxes*,
 accounting, it will be 41 years more,
 even all the time of *Artaxerxes Lon-*
gimanus, and then *Jaddus* must have
 been One hundred sixty and five
 Years old.

Years.

41

124

165

These are Difficulties that have per-
 plexed all Chronologers, and some
 finding it impossible to reconcile it,
 have been tempted to reject this Story
 of *Jaddus* and *Sanballat*, as a mere
 invention of *Josephus*.

There are but two things said, that
 will make this account of *Josephus* so
 much as probable; but both of them
 are as unaccountable as *Josephus* him-
 self. Some, as *Calvisius*, &c. set the

going of *Nehemiah* to *Jerusalem* sixty
 Years forwards in the Reign of *Artax-*
erxes Mnemon: But all those that do
 so, fix the time of finishing the second
 Temple (to make their Account hang
 together,) not in the Reign of *Darius*
Hystaspis, but of *Darius Nothus*. But
 this (besides that it is against the Judg-
 ment of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Eusebius*,
 and all Chronologers till *Scaliger*,)
 instead of clearing one Difficulty, it
 makes more and greater: For if the
 second Temple was finished in the
 Reign of *Darius Nothus*, then *Ezra*,
 and all those that saw the first Tem-
 ple, and surviv'd the building of the
 second, must have been at least 180
 Years old; and then also *Zerubbabel* and
Joshua must have lived to 145 Years.
 The Compute is thus; The Temple of
Solomon was destroyed in the Eleventh
 Year of *Zedechiah*, and that was eleven
 Years after the beginning of the *Baby-*
lonish Captivity. The Captivity lasted
 70 Years, and all agree that these 70
 Years ended sometime in the Reign
 of *Cyrus*, and probably three Years be-
 fore his Death. Now from those 3
 Years of *Cyrus*, to the 6th of *Darius*
Nothus, in which (saith *Calvisius*, and
 those that follow that Account) these-
 cond Temple was finish'd, is 115 Years.

Years.

3

Cyrus

7

Cambyses

1

Inter, Mag.

36

Darius Hystaspis

21

Xerxes

41

Artax. Longim.

6

Darius Nothus

115

To this add 59 Years of the Capti-
 vity, and 6 Years to a Child to lodg
 any thing in his memory: and then
Ezra and the rest must have been of
 the Age of 180.

Years.

115

59

6

180

Compare
2 Kin. 25.
18. 21.
and Ezra
7. 1.

Ibid.
P. 151.

Now that *Ezra* was living at the Destruction of the first Temple appears; for that his Father *Seraiah* was then slain by *Nebuchadnezzar*. And that several others, who saw the first Temple, and were returned from Captivity, and living at the building the second, is evident from the Prophet *Haggai*, Ch. 2. ver. 3. *Who is left among you that saw this House in her first Glory? And how do ye see it now? is it not in your Eyes in comparison of it as nothing?* *Calvisius* takes notice of this, pretending to answer it, by saying, that these words do not mean, as if any one that had seen *Solomon's Temple* was then alive; but they are so to be taken, as if he had said, *If, or Oh that any of you had seen, &c.* in the same manner that our Saviour's Words are to be understood, *What man among you having a hundred Sheep, &c.* and that they might collect the largeness of the Temple from the Foundations of it, and from the Compass of Mount *Moria*. As if the Prophet had only spoken a Parable to them, or as if by seeing the Glory, he only meant the Rubbish: Whereas 'tis plain, that the Prophet does not mean sight in Imagination and allusively, but actual seeing, and such as whereby they might compare one with the other, *Is it not in your Eyes in comparison of it as nothing?* and how could that be, except their Eyes had seen the Glory of the first Temple, as well as the meanness of that they then saw? And why should the same word (*see*.) and relating also to the comparing one object of Sight with another, in the same line, be understood in two different senses, in a metaphorical and a proper

sense; and if not, then they actually, and in a proper sense saw the Temple in her first Glory. as they did see it in the mean condition it then was. And this is the sense of all the Interpreters I have met with, and particularly of *St. Hierom*, (*in locum.*) And the Prophet plainly seems to refer to that of *Ezra*, Ch. 3. ver. 12. and which was but 12 or 13 Years before, *The Priests and Fathers that were ancient Men, and had seen the first House, when the Foundation of this House was laid before their Eyes, wept with a loud voice, and many shouted aloud for Joy.* And this I hope is not a Scene in the Fancy, or merely seeing the Foundations: For why should the sight of the Rubbish so mightily affect them? Or what need the mention of ancient Men? Or what could be the Reason of that great difference, that some should weep with a loud Voice, and others shout for Joy? For all saw the Foundations alike; and the young Men saw them as well as the ancient Priests and Fathers. It is plain therefore, That some of those that were at the building of the second Temple, saw the first Temple in its Glory, and while it stood; but then it is as plain, that the second Temple was finish'd in the Reign of *Darius Hystaspis*, and consequently that *Ezra* and *Nehemiah* went up to *Jerusalem*, not in the Reign of *Artaxerxes Mnemon*, but of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*; and then it will follow, that if *Sanballat* liv'd to the time of *Alexander*, he must at the Siege of *Tyre* have been 145 years old.

But however *Calvisius* thought he had got an Answer to that of *Haggai*; yet the Case of *Zerubbabel* and *Jeshua* perplexes him, and he does not know what to say to it: For it is plain that *Zerubbabel* and *Jeshua* (the one as Governor, the other as High-Priest) went up to *Jerusalem* upon the Edict of *Cyrus*, and continued in their respective Stations till the Temple was finished, and probably some time after; but if that

that Temple was not finished till the 6th. of *Darius Nothus* then both *Zerubbabel* and *Jeshua* must have been of the Age of 145. which is the same difficulty with *Sanballat*; for from the Edict of *Cyrus* to the 6th. of *Darius Nothus* is, as appears before, 115 years; and to this add 30 as a Competent age to qualify them for such great Offices, and that makes 145.

Magna est hac distantia, cujus exemplum par in nulla alia historia dari potest.
Ibid. 141.

Animadv. in Euseb. Chron. p. 90.

Calvisius plainly confesseth, That this is a great distance, and that there is not the like Example in any other History. I know *Scaliger* makes nothing of it, as if it had been a very ordinary matter for men to live so long; but for all

that it would have puzzled him, to have given but a few Instances; and those that have been they are famous, and as much taken notice of by Historians, as great Prodigies; and that also (like our old *Parr*) though it be of Men of the most private condition and extraction, and much more if it were of Princes and Governours; and yet neither *Josephus* himself, nor any other Historian takes the least notice either of *Zerubbabel* or *Jeshua*, or of *Sanballat*, *Nehemiah*, or *Jaddus*, living to any wonderful Age. And this I think is another prejudice to the Story.

But there is one thing more, and which I take to be full out as wonderful, and that is, that *Zerubbabel* should continue Governour of the Jews (as he must do, if *Calvisius* be in the right) under 7 Successive Kings of *Persia*, and these of such differing Tempers and Inclinations, and especially with respect to the Affairs of *Judaea*; such instances are as rare in the World, and perhaps more rare, than for a Man to live to 150 or 200 Years. This Chronologers and Historians (as far as my reading serves) do not take notice of, and yet I think it perplexes the Cause as much, and is as hardly to be reconcil'd to the

common Observations among Men, as such wonderful long Lives.

These are difficulties that are not easily reconcil'd; and therefore some take another way, and suppose that there were 2 *Sanballats*, and 2 *Jadduses*, one in the time of *Nehemiah*, and the other of *Alexander*; but besides that, *Josephus*, nor no other History intimate any such thing: It would be one of the strangest accidents in the World; for to make the Story compleat, you must not only suppose two *Sanballats*, two *Jadduses*, but that each of the *Jadduses* had a Brother, which Married the Daughter of each of the *Sanballats*, and for which respectively they were depos'd from the Priesthood. Now such a concurrence of all circumstances is like the *Platonick* year; and is not likely to return sooner. Or if such a strange thing should happen is it probable that all Histories would have been silent of it?

And all this plainly shews, with what difficulties this matter is clogg'd, and how perplex'd Chronologers have been with it; and the consequence is, that it is very unreasonable to make an Argument of, or draw any inference in reference to practice from such a doubtful and suspicious Story. For if it will not be granted, (as I suppose it will not very easily) that there were 2 such *Sanballats*, *Jadduses*, *Daughters* and *Brothers*, if it will not be granted that *Extra*, and those that surviv'd the Captivity and the building the second Temple, liv'd to above 180 years, or that *Zerubbabel* and *Jeshua* liv'd each of them to near 150, and (which is all out as strange) that *Zerubbabel* and *Jeshua* continued Governor and High Priest under 7 successive Kings of *Persia*; or if it will not be granted that *Sanballat* liv'd to above 145, and *Jaddus* himself to above 124. and all these mighty Ages not in the least mention'd by any Historian, then it will follow that the Story of *Sanballat* and *Jaddus*, with respect to the Times of *Alexander*, is a mistake in *Josephus*.

And it is farther to be observ'd that, the placing of Sanballat and Jaddus to the Times of Alexander, is a main Ground of this perplexity among Chronologers, whereas had they rejected Josephus's Authority in this, as they do in other matters relating to the Persian Monarchy, they would not have been put upon such difficulties, as to allot such mighty Ages to particular Men.

Historias in utraque parte adeo manifestas esse, ut necesse sit in utraque sententia alterutrum horum vel Jesuæ & Zorobabelli, vel Nehemiæ & Sanballati, tantam ætatem concedere, quæ major sit annis centum & quadraginta. Ibid. p. 149.

Calvisius says, That the *Historias on both sides (i. e. the Account of Josephus, and his own)* are so manifest, that whoever takes either of them it is necessary to assign either to Jeshua and Zerubbabel, or to Nehemiah and Sanballat, an Age of above 140 Years. And this is true enough, if Josephus his Account be admitted, but if it be rejected, then there would

be no need of making Men live to such prodigious Ages, to fill up the spaces. Let it be but granted that Josephus is out in his Account of Sanballat and Jaddus (as he is notoriously in other matters relating to those times;) and then the Times would be computed by more moderate and accountable Ages. And the Jewish Chronologers do not only condemn Josephus in other matters, but in this very particular they affirm, That the Temple on Mount Gitizim was built long before the Times of Alexander; and that all the time of Alexander, Simeon justus was High Priest: Now Simeon justus was the Son of Onias, and the Grandson of Jaddus.

And (to say no more) we have the Judgments of two very considerable Authours, and who were not at all concern'd in the present Controversie, and which I suppose was never before started. Our excellent Ly-

Nimirum aut hic dicit, speaking of Sanballat. alius fuit ab eo unus. saith, Either this was ano-

ther from him that was Father in Law to one of the Sons of Jolada, whom Nehemiah mentions, or else Josephus is equally false and contrary to himself, in determining the Age in which Sanballat liv'd, as he is in almost all the Chronology of the Persian Monarchy.

Johannes Temporarius in his Chronology, l. 3. p. 197. speaking of this matter, says, That Jaddus and Sanballat, which are spoken of by Josephus, either they are diverse from those mentioned by Ezra; or, which I rather suspect, they are the most vain Fictions of Josephus himself, concerning Jaddus and Sanballat.

But besides these Difficulties in Chronology, there are several Inconsistencies in the Story it self, noted by Salian, as that the Phœnicians and Chaldeans, who followed Alexander, thought to have plundered the City; and how should he have Chaldeans in his Army, when as yet he had not taken Babylon nor come near to Chaldaea? Josephus a little after says, that the Jews besought Alexander, that he would suffer the Jews who lived about Babylon, and Media to use their own Laws and Rites; and which he freely granted: Whereas at that time he had not conquered Babylon nor Meia, nor so much as been at them. He tells us that the Army was astonished to see Alexander worship Jaddus; and Parmenio asked him how he that was ador'd by all, should himself now adore the High Priest of the Jews; whereas at that time Alexander never thought of being ador'd, or did believe himself the Son of Jupiter, that Madness came upon him first in Egypt, and which was not till a year after.

And now does any man think, that a Sto-

filiorum Joiadæ filii Eliashibi Socero, cujus meminit Nehem. cap. ult. aut æque falsus, & sibi ipsi contrarius est Josephus, in definiendo Sæculo Sanballati, ac in pleraque alia Chronologiæ. Monarchiæ Persicæ. De Emendat. Temp. p. 65.

Jaddus & Sanballatus, qui in Historia Josephi recensentur, aut alii sunt ab iis qui ab Ezra memorantur, vel, quod magis suspicor, vanissima sunt Josephi Commenta de Jaddo & Sanballato.

An. Mun. 3722.

Chronologia Divid. Ganz edita per Vorstium.

pag. 287.

246.

59.

a Story, that is thus clogg'd with so many and those insuperable Difficulties, fit to make an Argument of, or that any regular Inference, or Conclusion can be drawn from thence in reference to our practices, especially in a matter of such mighty weight and concerns, as that which is before us? It is worth the while to observe the

Qui Autoritate Josephi nituntur, illi insistent Fundamento valde lubrico & infirmo. Et paulo post, Cum circa hac tempora Josephus, ita aberrat, quis tuto ipsius assertioni fidem præbere potest? Ibid. p. 148.

account *Calvisius* gives us of *Josephus*, and his History of those times. They that rest upon the Authority of *Josephus* stand upon a very slippery and weak Foundation. And farther adds, when *Josephus* is so much out concerning these times, who can safely give Credit to what he asserts? Now [this

Story of *Jaddus* and *Alexander*, and the assigning of *Sanballat* and *Jaddus* to that time, stand purely upon the Authority of *Josephus*, and not only so, but in a manner contrary to much better Authority; But however, if that Authority (in matters relating to those times) be not sufficient to be rely'd on, then it follows, that the Story of *Jaddus* is not to be depended on; and standing upon a Foundation so slippery and infirm, is not of sufficient Authority to be drawn into an Argument. And it is not only *Calvisius*, but all Chronologers give us the same Character of *Josephus*; and his Errours and Mistakes concerning those times are so many and gross, as would make any man, that acted upon Principles of Sincerity, very fearful to use an Example taken out of him, in matters of Practice; for however Chronologers may dispute, and whatever Arguments may be raised in matters of less moment, yet when it comes to a point of Conscience, Men that have a care of their Souls, will hardly venture to act upon one single Example, and that also vouch'd but by a single and suspicious Authority. An Argument from

Example is at best but a poor one; but it must be very poor indeed, when the Example it self is doubtful. The Practice of the High Priest in that corrupt State of the Jewish Church, will not signifie much to us and no more in this than in their other Immoralities; and *Jaddus* becoming a Subject to *Alexander*, contrary to his Oath, is no more a Pattern for us to follow, than *Eliashib's* building a Chamber in the Temple for *Tobiah*, is an Argument for us to act contrary to the express Laws of God: but then it must needs signifie much less, when that Practice wants sufficient Clearness and Evidence to prove it.

If it be said here, That, whether the Story be true or no, the Convocation seems to believe it, and have inserted part of it into the Convocation-Book; and it is not the matter of Fact, but their Sense we are enquiring into: I say so too; but I say likewise, That their Sense is not to be extended beyond their words, nor are they to be made Parties to any more of the Story than they have inserted in their Book.

They mention and thereby approve *Jaddus's* Answer to *Alexander*, that he had sworn Allegiance to *Darius*; and therefore could not violate his Oath so long as *Darius* liv'd. And from thence we may conclude, that their Sense is, That an Oath of Allegiance was binding to a Prince, so long as he lived, and had not given up his Right, tho he was beaten in the Field, and fled before his Enemies.

But for the other part of the story of *Jaddus* submitting to *Alexander* while *Darius* was living, the Convocation takes no Notice of it, nor does it any where appear, that they thought *Darius* was then living; and therefore from hence nothing can be concluded as to their Sense.

And I ask those who from the instance of *Jaddus* urge Submission to a Possessor of Power, notwithstanding an

Oath to a lawful King, who is alive, and insists upon his Right. Whether they argue from the Story; or from the Convocation Book? If from the Story, it is false, or at least suspicious. If from the Convocation Book, they say nothing of it. And if there be nothing in the Premises, there must be likewise nothing in the Conclusion. But,

2. Grant the Story true, it is not to the purpose it is urged for. *Josephus* tells us that God appeared to *Jaddus* in a Dream, and warn'd him to submit to *Alexander*, and to meet him in that Solemn manner he did. So that this is a Singular and exempt Case, and falls within the circumstances of *Jehu* and *Ahud*.

If it be said, That Prophecy at that time was departed from the Jewish Church, and therefore they could not have any Revelation.

I answer, That *Haggai* and *Zacharias*, and after them *Malachi*, prophesied in the time of the second Temple, and it is generally concluded for the space of 40 Years. And after them they had an inferior degree of Prophecy, which lasted for a long time, as the *Bath Kol*. and probably some other ways, as by Dreams, &c.

It was always the custom in the Jewish Church, in Cases of great Extremity and Emergency, to have recourse to God for some express Revelation, what they should do. And here *Josephus* tells us, were all the Preparations to it: They fasted and prayed, and the next night God appeared to *Jaddus*, (how ever as we have the Story from *Josephus*, so we must take it all from him, and he tells expressly, that God appeared to him,) and ordered him so to do, and God's appearing and Command stands upon the same Authority with all the rest of the Story. And then it is wholly besides the purpose it is alledged for: For there is a wide difference

between acting by common and standing Rules, and by express Revelation: and if these Gentlemen will shew us any express Revelation for what they do, as *Jaddus* had, then they say something; but till they can shew that, this Example of *Jaddus*, if it were true, will do them no Service.

I now come to consider the first Proposition, which (page 3.) stands thus: *That the Power of Kings was originally Patriarchal, derived from God, and not from the People.* But when the Authour comes to repeat it, (p. 6.) he makes another thing of it: *That Government in general, whether Monarchy, or any other form, derives its Authority from God, the Authour of Nature, and consequently of human Society, and not from the People, (though their Consent be ordinarily necessary to the Constitution both of the Form of Government, and the Persons governing, &c.)* Now whether the Authour, who undertakes to demonstrate things out of the Convocation Book that never were there, will also undertake to demonstrate, that these two are one and the same Proposition. But for my part, I am disappointed: For finding the first Proposition twice mentioned, I thought (to save the Readers pains and my own, and to prevent needless repetition) to have considered the same Proposition in both places at once. But I am mistaken: For though the Authour calls them both the first Proposition, they are no more like one another, than a Apple is like an Oyster; and he would have been more to the purpose, to have called the one the first Proposition, and the other the last.

And as to the first of the first Propositions, I have only this now to observe: That the Authour by his Exposition of it hath expounded away the Sense of the Convocation, as he always does: For (saith he pag 3.) *Though Kings are or ought to be bound up, and limited*

limited in the exercise of their Power by Laws. By what Laws I pray? And who ought to bind them up? Why could not this be expressed in the words of the Convocation, and which the Author refers to, Ch. 1. ? which are these: *It is manifest in the Scriptures, that the Kings in the old Testament were as strictly bound to the observation of God's Laws in their Government, as Moses, &c.*

And it sounds a little harsh to say that God ought to bind them up, and limit them, and by the Author's disjunctive *are or ought to be bound up*. It is plain he means what the Convocation does not, for all Princes, whether absolute or not, are already, and ever were strictly bound to the observation of God's Laws in their Government. He is their superiour, and to him onely they are accountable; but their Power being derived from God, and not from the People they are not accountable to them for any exercise of that Power, whether they exercise it justly or unjustly. And this is the sense of the Convocation; and this if the Author had pleas'd, he might have deduc'd from his Proposition, and much more naturally, than by troubling his Readers with an impertinent Rant about Absoluteness, and the Conceits of it.

I am at length come to that which the Author says is the *Groundwork of the whole Discourse*. And that is the last of his first Propositions. And here I will not much trouble my self with the Repugnances and Disagreements between this and his first Proposition, which notwithstanding he calls the same. He tells us here that *Government in general* (and that I am sure is not Patriarchal; for that is a particular kind of it) *whether Monarchy, or any other form, (and that also is not Patriarchal, nor originally Patriarchal, but a Corruption of it, and deviation from it,) derives its Authority from God, the Authour of Nature, and consequently of human Society.*

What the Author means by these last words I cannot tell; they are not in the Convocation, and I suspect he hath some bad meaning in them. They seem to intimate as if God was the Authour of Government no otherwise than as he is the Authour of Nature, (I suppose he means human Nature.) And having made Mankind of a sociable Nature, by that they were directed to Society, and from that to Government. For he says God the Authour of Nature, and consequently, (i. e.) consequential to that Nature of Humane Society. And if this be his meaning, it is not only a perfect contradiction to the whole Stream of the Convocation Book, but to his own first Proposition, which tells us, *That Government was originally Patriarchal. It follows in the Author, and not from the People, (though their Consent be ordinarily necessary to the constitution, both of the Form of Government, and the Persons governing.)* Now we must remember again, that the Author says, *he hath extracted these Propositions out of the Convocation Book.* Sure he hath got a Convocation Book of his own, which no Body ever saw but himself; for all the Books we have deliver the clean contrary almost in every Page. If the Author thinks the Peoples Consent ordinarily necessary to the Constitution both of the Form and Persons, it is plain the Convocation never thought so, but the contrary. And if he please he may dispute the Point against them. But he must not impose upon us, and make us believe that he demonstrates out of the Convocation, when he delivers things most contrary to what they do.

Well, at last however, through all the Authors Shufflings and Intermixings, we are got to this Point, *That Government derives its Power from God, and not from the People.* And what I pray does this Demonstrate? A Man would imagine that this demonstrated, That Kings held only of God, That the People

People of all sorts and Ranks had nothing to do with the Government, nor could call Kings to account for their Administrations. And so indeed the Convocation concludes, but the Author had no mind to meddle with that. But forsooth from the Right Reverend the Author he observes Three things.

P. 6. And is not this an admirable way of giving the Sense of an Author to put some of his words into Propositions, and then to give us the sense of those Propositions, not from the places where they are mentioned, nor from the Inferences or Conclusions the Author himself draws from them, but by Observing something, and that differing from the Author's Sense in some other parts of his Book. At this rate a Man may extract Chalk from Cheese, or any thing out of any thing. Well, but what is it that this Author observes,

He observes——

That all Kingdoms are now (what was more peculiarly appropriated to the Jewish Nation) in their first Constitution in some sort Theocracies. Now the Author may observe this, if he please; but to say that he observes this from the Right Reverend the Author, is like all the rest; for the Right Reverend the Author observes no such thing at all. This Author observes, That now all Kingdoms are in a sort Theocracies: but the Convocation observes that God govern'd the World by the Ministry of Civil Magistrates always, and no more now than heretofore, even before the Jewish constitution. This Author observes that all Kingdoms are in a sort Theocracies,

But this is his own peculiar observation, and I doubt he will find it hard to observe this not only from the Right Reverend Author, but even from any other, for by that the Convocation and all Men else hitherto have understood, God's governing the Jews in a peculiar manner, immediately by himself, and distinct from other Nations. And

does not the Author say, *it was more peculiarly appropriated to the Jewish Nation.* And how will he reconcile that to all Nations? But we live in an Age where all our old Standards are thrown down, and new ones raised in their Room; we have had a new Notion of Allegiance, a new Notion of Succession, and a new Notion of Right and Wrong, and now our Author gives us a new Notion of Theocracy, by which he means God's permissive Providence, and any Man that God permits to get the Possession of Power in other Kingdoms, he has as good a Title to the Peoples Allegiance, as if he had been (among the Jews) expressly constituted a Ruler and Governor by God himself, and as particularly named, as Moses, Joshua, or any of the Judges. For having cited out of the Convocation, That God being the Lord of the World, and in the Government of it, useth the Ministry of Civil Magistrates, as well in other Countries as among his own peculiar People Israel. And that he holds himself the Helm of every Kingdom, and useth their Services in such sort, as to Exercise his own just Judgments, Will and good Pleasure.

Now (saith the Author) *This he does by reserving to his Providence the Prerogative of Designation of the Person whom he intends for his Vicegerent.* Now by this the Author does not mean Providence proceeding according to Legal Right and Justice; or if he does, it is not to his purpose; and yet all this may be done, and not a Title of any Man's single Right violated. But Providence permitting the Possession of Power, contrary to all Law and Right among Men; and to make such a Providence the Foundation of Obedience, and which is more, of transferring Allegiance, notwithstanding the most sacred Engagements to the contrary, is a most absurd and ungodly Doctrine, as will appear presently.

P. 7.

In the mean time, the Authour is very unfortunate in proving his Principles. For to prove that Providence designs the Person of the Sovereign in other Kingdoms (as well as in Judah,) he instances the disappointment of Adonijah, Solomon's Elder Brother; as if he did not know that this was done in the Kingdom of Israel, and that Solomon was designed King in the Room of David not by Providence, but by God's express Nomination.

P. 8. Well, for all that on goes our Authour, and proves it from another Instance in the Kingdom of Israel, and by God's express appointment; as the Case of Rehoboam, and Jeroboam, and the rending of the Ten Tribes. And not content with these, he tells us farther, That the History of the Kings of Israel amply Testifie, how God had extinguished the Line-Royal, and advanced to the Crown such as had no relation to it. And are not these now pure Proofs of a Theocracy in other Kingdoms? And that God by his Providence designs the Persons of his Vicegerents in other Nations as well as Israel; for that was the Authour's first Observation? Well, it may be he might observe it in other Kingdoms, but he hath only prov'd it in the Kingdom of Judah. But I must not let his instance of Rehoboam pass, to which the Authour thus delivers:

God sometimes, for the only designed usurpation of a Prince, whose Title, and that in an Hereditary Kingdom, was altogether indisputable, does deprive him of the Government in part or whole, and will not allow him so much as to endeavour the regaining it, which was the Case of Rehoboam. There are two things deserve Reflection: The one is that Rehoboam's not regaining the Ten Tribes was expressly forbidden by God, and so nothing to our Authour's purpose. But had he not had that express Prohibition, might he not then have endeavoured to regain them, notwithstanding any Providential Permission of Jeroboam's possessing himself of them?

This is the Case, and I think neither the Authour nor any body else will deny but he might. And then it follows that the permission of Providence is no Rule for Acquiescence or Submission to those Persons whom Providence permits to possess themselves of Power.

The other is a foul prevarication of Scripture. The Authour says, that God deprived Rehoboam of his Government for his only desired usurpation. Compare Whereas the Scripture is as express as 1. Kio. 12 can be, that it was for the Idolatry of 15. and his Father Solomon. I confess I the 11. 11. 33. less wonder that he prevaricates with the Convocation, that can make thus bold with the Scripture it self.

From the whole Observation the Authour says, All that I will note hence is, that the Line of Descent in an Hereditary Kingdom may be interrupted, and yet the Law of Succession not violated. Not violated? That is one of the strangest things in the World; not violated in the Case of Jeroboam? nor violated when the Authour says, such were advanced to the Crown who had no Relation to it? Perhaps the Authour may say, it cannot properly be said, That God by so doing, did violate the Law of Succession. But he may observe that the reason of that is, because God is above the Law, and not ty'd to observe it, and so he does not violate, what he has no Obligation to observe. In the mean while the Law is not kept, and no Man can say that the Law of Succession was observ'd, when Jeroboam, or others, that had no Relation to the Regal Line were advanc'd to the Crown: And all that I shall note hence is, That the Authour extracts Notes, with as little Fairness, as he does Propositions.

His second Remark is, That a Sovereign may be divested of his Power which he received from God, and decline into the inferior Condition of a Subject. Very well: But the Question is how this may be? And the Convocation tells us, two ways; ———— When

P. 8.

P. 77.

When God expressly nominates and appoints another Person to be King, as in the case of *Jehu* and *Ahud*. Or by the Submission and Acknowledgment of those in whom the Right was, as in the Case of *Aristobulus* and his Sons. These are all the Convocation mentions, and to do the Authour Right, these are all that he extracts out of them in this Observation. And let the Authour take which he please, or both of them, and make his best of them.

3. His third Remark is, *That when a Prince is thus divested of his Power from God, and another advanc'd to his Throne, our Legal Allegiance may justly be claimed by the Possessor.*

Now let us connect the second Remark with this, and they run thus: That a Sovereign may be divested of his Power, and decline into the Inferiour condition of a Subject. And when he is thus divested, (*i. e.*) when he declines into the inferiour condition of a Subject, why then I know nothing to the contrary, but Allegiance may be transferred to the Prince whose Subject he is. And if the Authour please to demonstrate, that one in the world is a Subject, or a Subject in the present Government, he may save himself the labour of any other Demonstration: But till he does that, all his Demonstrations are beside the Cushion. For tho he produces the Convocation with a great deal of Confidence, we shall find upon examining it, that it will by no means serve his turn, nor in the least prove what he designs by it, nor any way countenance such Submission as the Authour pleads for.

P. 10.

The mighty Place is this, *Ch. 28. p. 57.* The Convocation, taking notice of the variation of Governments in the World, hath these words. "And when having attain'd their ungodly desires, (whether Ambitious Kings, by bringing any Country into their Subjection; or disloyal Subjects, by their Rebellious Rising against their natural Sove-

reign,) they have establish'd any of the said degenerate Forms of Government amongst their People; the Authority either so unjustly gotten, or wrung by force from the true and lawful Possessor being always God's Authority, (and therefore receiving no Impeachment by the wickedness of those who have it,) is ever (when any such Alterations are thoroughly settled) to be revered and obeyed, and the People of all sorts, as well of the Clergy, as of the Laity, are to be subject unto it, not only for fear, but also for Conscience sake.

Upon which the Author saith, *All that can be moved hereupon is, when a Government may be said to be settled.* If the Author pleaseth he may put it into the words of the Convocation, and that is (more than mere settled) *thoroughly settled.*

And to resolve that Question our Authour adds, *And with submission I can't but conceive, that the Government is settled when the Crown, with all its Dignities, Prerogatives, Administrations, Authorities, Revenues, &c. are generally recogniz'd, and personally enjoy'd; which must be supposed to be, when all Places of Power and Trust, of Royalty and Importance, are in the Sovereign's hands, and wholly at his disposal.* Now I ask the Authour, whether the Government of *Limerick* be a Place of Power, Trust, and Importance? If it be, then the Authour's Notion of a Settlement (if it were true) will do him no service, nor can he prove we ought to submit. For as yet all Places of Power, Trust, and Importance, are not in his hands, nor at his disposal and consequently the Government is not *thoroughly settled*, according to the Author's own Account of such a settlement, If it be said that place is in *Ireland*, and *England* is a Kingdom entire of itself, then what becomes of the poor *Irish* men? I doubt they must be Rebels for all our Authour's Demonstration; and then also, what can be said to justify a War there, and

and excuse the Army's fighting against a Prince who hath both Right and Authority. If it be said *Ireland* is a branch of the Crown of *England*, annex'd to it, and dependent of it; then I say that the *Crown with all its Dignities, Authorities, Revenues, &c.* are not personally enjoy'd, and then according to our Author the Government is not settled; and so he has made a fair *Demonstration*. He demonstrates, we ought to submit, when the Government is settled, and then he Demonstrates the Government is not settled, and so we ought not to submit. Well; however let us for once suppose that the Crown and all its Dignities, &c. (I suppose the Author excepts a Right Title) are recogniz'd and enjoy'd. What then? Why then, *with submission*, the Author cannot but conceive the Government is settled. Now we must remember that the Author tells us, that in his Book, Obedience and Submission to the Present Government is demonstrated from the Convocation; and it is to be noted likewise, That this is all he offers us for *Demonstration* out of that book, and is his cannot but conceive to *Demonstrate*. I hope the Author does not think all his *Conceits Demonstrations*, how strongly soever he may be possess'd with them. Well, it must be own'd, how bold soever the Author is in his Assertions, he is very modest in his Proofs: It is in the Title, high and lofty *Demonstrate*, but in the Proof very humble and meek, he can't but conceive, and that also with *Submission*.

But whtsoever the Author may conceive, it is plain the Convocation does not conceive that the enjoyment of the *Crown with all its Dignities, &c.* is that thorough Settlement to which is due Submission and Obedience, as to God's Authority; as in the Case before mentioned of *Joah* and *Athaliah*. *Athaliah* personally enjoy'd the Crown with all its Dignities, &c. And all Places of Power, Trust, &c. were in her hands, and

at her disposal; and this also for no less a time than six years, and in as full and ample a manner, as any Usurper, or any Rightful King ever enjoy'd them: But for all that the Convocation is so far from urging obedience to her, as to God's Authority, that they expressly justify the Resisting, nay, the Slaying her. And this is a clear *Demonstration*, that by a thorough Settlement the Convocation does not mean a full Possession of Power merely: For they say that when a Government is thoroughly settled, it ought to be obeyed, as God's Authority, not only for Fear, but for Conscience sake. But they say also, that when *Athaliah* was fully possessed of the Throne, she ought not to be obeyed, but to be resisted and slain. And the Conclusion from these Premises is, that to be fully possessed of the Throne, is not of it self to be so thoroughly settled as to make it God's Authority, and Obedience to become a Duty. So that whatever the Convocation may mean by thorough settled, it is plain they do not mean by it what our Author does; and I think there is no difficulty at all, (if Men will look without prejudice,) in understanding what they do mean by it.

There are but two ways to understand the sense of any Author; the natural and usual Construction of the words they express themselves by, and if there be any obscurity or doubt in the meaning of some Expressions, to interpret them by other Expressions and Assertions in the same Author. Let us try these in the Controversie before us.

I. The words in Controversie are *Thoroughly settled*. And the Question is, what is usually understood by them?

I am pretty confident. That bare Possession, let it be never so full as to the Extent, was never meant by them, with respect to Civil Possessions, (and that is the Case.) Settlement is a Term

very usual and common in our Law, and most Men understand the sense of it, and express themselves by it accordingly. It denotes these two things:

1. The Legality of a thing, its being according to Law. *Settlement* and *Establishment* are synonymous; an illegal Settlement is no Settlement; and nothing in a Government can be said to be settled, but what stands upon the Foundation of Law. This is the Basis of all Settlements in a Constitution, and without this 'tis a Castle in the Air, a Building without a Foundation, and such a Settlement as never was heard of.

2. It denotes a quiet and peaceable Possession, without Disturbance from other Claims or Pretenders. A Man can never be said to be settled in an Estate, who hath only an *usurped Possession* of it and when there are other and better Claims and Titles on foot against him, and by virtue of which he may be ejected the next Assizes. And to say a Man is settled in the Possession, when the right Owner is actually at Law with him for it, or declares that he will be so, so soon as he has opportunity, or Money to manage the Suit, is very strange, if any thing in this Age can be strange.

If our Ancestors should rise up amongst us, and we should express ourselves to them in the most obvious Terms of *Allegiance*, *Succession*, *Settlement*; they would no more understand our meaning, than if we talked to them in the Language of the *Indies*. We have a Metaphysical Allegiance, and to suit that we must now have a Philosophical Settlement; as if a Man was settled in Civil Possessions just as he is settled in his Seat, or on Horse-back: If he can but get his Feet in the Stirrups, and the Reins in his Hands he is settled in the Saddle. But surely there is somewhat more to settle a Man in the Possession

of any Estate, and much more of the greatest Civil Possession. At this rate, if a man can but get into the Manour-House, and persuade the Servants and Tenants to attorn to him, he is as firmly settled in the Possession of it, as if he had purchased it with his Money, or it had descended to him by a thousand Generations. — But there is no end of Absurdities.

There is one word more to be considered, and that is *thoroughly* (*thoroughly settled*.) And the Convocation is very exact and precise, and have used that word both in the Chapter, and also repeated it in the Canon, laying a great stress upon it, and as if the whole determination of the business depended on it; and certainly they meant something by it. Now what is the Import of *thoroughly*; but perfectly, to all intents and purposes. The Latines express it *omnino*; *omni ex parte*; a Government that is altogether, upon all accounts settled. Put these together, *Settlement* always respects Right, and a peaceable Possession of that Right, without any better Claims or Pretenders; and a *thorough Settlement* is the utmost of that: and that is when such a Right is enjoy'd plainly, evidently, without any Contradiction or Objection.

This is the plain meaning of the Words, and therefore the plain meaning of the Convocation: But if there were any obscurity in them, it will appear by consulting the Context, and other places, that that was their meaning, and no other; and that is the other way of understanding the sense of an Author.

I have already consider'd the Instance of *Athaliah*, which is as full and direct against the Author as any thing can be, and can never be evaded, but by charging the Convocation with being as inconsiderate, and as full of Contradictions as himself: But for the farther

ther clearing this Point there is one thing more to be observed from that Instance, and that is the Reason they give why *Athaliah* was a *Tyrannical Usurper*, and upon what account they justify the Proceedings of *Jehoiada* and the People against her; and that is, *Joash, their late King's Son, being then their only natural Lord and Sovereign*, and which in the Canon they express thus, *the right Heir of that Kingdom being then alive*; plainly intimating, That if the right Heir had not been alive, *Athaliah*, (by what ill means soever she attain'd it,) having got Possession of the Kingdom, would by that have had a Right to the Government: For a Possessory Right is something, and where there is no better, that ought to carry it. And the Conclusion from hence is this: That any Person (by what means soever) gaining the Possession of the Throne, if there be no better Claims against him, then he hath a Right to it; and then, and not till then, he is *thoroughly settled*. It is agreed on all hands, That a Right to a Government may be acquired, by the death or cession of the Persons in whom the Right was: And this is the Case.

In this Chapter the Convocation mentions several variations of Government, as to the Forms, Aristocracy, and Democracy; and as to the ambitious enroaching of Kings upon their Neighbours, and particularly the four Monarchies, and the King of *Babylon* upon the Jews: All which respective Governments, though they were begun by Rebellion, Ambition, and unlawful means, (which the Convocation condemns,) yet afterwards they became lawful Governments, and had *such* a Right to the respective Governments they did possess. And I defie the Authour, or any Man else, to shew me one single Instance (either in this Chapter, or any where in the whole Book,) of any Government, That the

Convocation requires or justifies Allegiance to be paid to it, but what had first acquired such a Right. And if they cannot, as I am pretty well assured they cannot, why do they make such a Pother about two words, and disingenuously and unworthily interpret them, both contrary to their common and usual meaning, and contrary to the whole Doctrine, and every Instance in the whole Book.

This was the Case of the *Babylonian*, *Persian*, *Macedonian*, and *Roman* Governments over the Jews; but this was not the Case of *Athaliah* and *Antiochus Epiphanes*; and therefore the Convocation requires Submission to *those*, but justifies the Resistance of *these*.

This Proposition in the Convocation is universal, *That whatever Government is thoroughly settled, ought to be obeyed*. And if it appears in all and every one of the Instances they give of Government, to which they say Obedience is due, that these Governments had such a Right; and if it appears likewise, that in every one of these Instances they give of Government, where there was not *such* a Right, (tho never so full Possession of Power,) that they may be resisted: Then it plainly follows, that as by being *thoroughly settled*, they do not mean bare Possession of Power, (tho it be never so full,) so by it they do mean, and can mean nothing else than the Acquisition of *such* a Right. And this I take to be fair Reasoning, for every Authour is the best Interpreter of his own sense. And when the Convocation gives us a general Rule about Obedience to Government, what better way is there to understand their meaning, than to apply our selves to their particular Instances, (which in all Cases explain and prove general Rules?) And if they give us Instances of some Governments, where was Possession and no Right, and justify the Resistance of such Governments, and if they give us

very usual and common in our Law, and most Men understand the sense of it, and express themselves by it accordingly. It denotes these two things:

1. The Legality of a thing, its being according to Law. *Settlement* and *Establishment* are synonymous; an illegal Settlement is no Settlement; and nothing in a Government can be said to be settled, but what stands upon the Foundation of Law. This is the Basis of all Settlements in a Constitution, and without this 'tis a Castle in the Air, a Building without a Foundation, and such a Settlement as never was heard of.

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Instances of other Governments where was both Possession and Right, and say they ought to be Obeyed: It is plain the difference only lies between *Right* and no *Right*; and they mean where there is Possession of Government and no *Right*, it is *not* thoroughly settled, and may be resisted; and where is Possession and *Right* it is thoroughly settled, and ought to be obeyed. And let those Gentlemen who talk so much of a *plenary Possession without Right* try if they can find any one Instance in the whole Convocation Book, that will run parallel with the Doctrines they teach, and the Interpretations they make. For my part I know but two, (*Athaliah* and *Antiochus*,) and both which the Convocation condemns; all the rest (and which the Convocation approves) they had acquir'd a *Right* to the respective Governments. And it is an unaccountable Method of Interpretation to pick out two words from a Book, and put a Sense on them directly contrary to all Instances in that Book.

But that this and no other is their meaning of a Government being *thoroughly settled*, is farther evident from the Proof the Convocation brings of this Doctrine in this Chapter: For after that they had asserted that a Government, (by what ill means soever attain'd,) after it is *thoroughly settled* ought to be obey'd. For the Proof and Confirmation of this Assertion they immediately mention the *Israelites* not Rebelling against the Kings of *Egypt*, tho' oppressed, &c. and the Jews, when in Subjection to the Kings of *Babylon*, are condemn'd by the Prophet *Jeremy* for rebelling against them by the Intigation of false Prophets, &c. Now I suppose no Man will deny but the Convocation produc'd those as a full and direct Proof of their Assertions (for they add no other,) and the connexion is this: A Government, though obtain'd by ill means,

when thoroughly settled, is to be obeyed; for that the *Israelites* obey'd the Kings of *Egypt*, and the Jews in Captivity did the same to the Kings of *Babylon*. And then we have a clear account what they mean by a Government *thoroughly settled*; i. e. such a Government as was the *Egyptian* over the *Israelites*, the *Babylonian* over the Jews: And each of these had an undoubted *Right* to their respective Governments. Such a *Right* I mean as that we are now speaking of by Death, Cession or Prescription; and then it necessarily follows, that they mean a Government is then only *thoroughly settled* when such a *Right* is acquir'd, otherwise these Instances, (which the Convocation brings to prove and illustrate it) instead of confirming destroy's their main Assertion, and it would stand thus: In the Assertion it would be Possession *without Right* is God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed; but in the proof Possession *with Right* is God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed.

The Sum of this Matter is this: There are several ways of attaining a *Right* to a Government, besides Lineal Descent, as by the Death or Submission of those in whom the *Right* was joined with the Consent and Submission of the People; and also a long undisturbed Possession, called Prescription. Now all Mankind are agreed, That a *Right* to a Government by these ways, may be attained; and though the ways that are used to attain that *Right*, are always unjust, (as the Convocation says by Ambition, Rebellion, &c.) Yet when that *Right* is attained, these Governments respectively are then lawful Governments, and ought to be obeyed. Upon this Foot most, if not all the Governments in the World do now stand, and the Convocation Book (as the Title expresses) concerns the Government of the Kingdoms of the whole World. And agreeably to that they were obliged to Discourse of all the

the Rights of Government, which they do under two Heads or *Classes*. Such Rights of Government as are attained by just ways; and such Rights as are attained by unjust ways: And having before spoken of those Rights that are justly attained, as by God's express Nomination and Lineal Descent, they now in this Chapter come to discourse of those Rights which are attained by unjust ways, as by Rebellion of Subjects, Ambition, and Greediness of Encroaching Kings. But lest it should be thought that the wicked ways of attaining this Right was a prejudice to the Right it self, and People from thence should take occasion to Rebel, and disturb all the Governours of the World, because they could not shew an express Order from God, or derive the Pedigree of their Government from *Adam* to *Noah*; to prevent the terrible Confusions that such a Notion would make in the World, they say that the wicked ways of attaining it, or the wickedness of the Persons that have it, is no Impeachment of the Right it self; but when it is attained, it is God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed, as the *Israelites* obeyed *Pharaoh*, and as the *Jews* obeyed *Nebuchadnezzar*.

This is the plain and obvious sense of this Chapter, this the nature of the Thing, this their Method led them to, and this is agreeable to all the Instances they give us of Government, and this is suitable to all the Doctrines which they teach about it.

Now therefore I shall further shew the Absurdity of this Author's Interpretation in the three following Particulars:

I. It is inconsistent with the main and fundamental Doctrine delivered in the Book.

II. It reproaches the Worthies of the Church of *England*, who suffered between the Years 42. and 60.

III. It maintains an absurd, unreasonable, and ungodly Doctrine.

1. Such an Interpretation is inconsistent with the main and fundamental Doctrines of the Convocation Book.

I have already shewed it is inconsistent with all the Instances they give, and I shall now shew that it is inconsistent with the fundamental Doctrines they teach.

The principal Doctrines of the Convocation Book are *Passive Obedience* and *Nonresistance*, and the whole Design of it seems to be, (that I mean that concerns the Civil Government,) to make it good, That Subjects are bound to obey their lawful Governors, and upon no Account whatsoever to resist them: This, I say, is their fundamental Doctrine, and whatever they deliver, it hath some way or other a reference to it; and therefore it is but necessary to interpret their Expressions in such a sense as may best suit with their main Design. And now let us try which Interpretation of a *Thorough Settlement* best agrees with *Passive Obedience*, and That we are in Justice bound to believe to be the sense of the Convocation.

Now to say a Government is *thoroughly settled*, when it hath acquired a Right, by a long Tract of uninterrupted Possession, or by the utter Destruction, or Submission, of the Right Heirs; this does not in the least interfere with the Doctrine of *Passive Obedience*, but is consonant to it, and to every other Doctrine and Expression in the whole Book. But for our Authour's Interpretation, when a Person hath got full Possession of Power, and the Lawful King

is alive, and so far from submitting that he actually contests his Right, and demands the Allegiance of his Subjects in order to it: In such a Case, to say that they must quit their lawful King, become Subjects to the Possessor, transfer all their Allegiance and Duty to him, do all they can to Establish him in the Possession, and as much to keep the other out, become irreconcilable and mortal Enemies to him, and if need be to fight against and kill him, (for all these necessarily follow from that Notion.) Now how the Author will *Demonstrate* this to be Passive Obedience, or reconcile it to it, is not for me to comprehend. The Author hath offered at as strange things as that: For if any one of a Family, though never so many degrees off, and him set up by the People too, be Succession in a Hereditary Monarchy. If forceable Possession be a *thorough settlement*; then for any thing I know, fighting against and killing a Rightful King, even when we acknowledg the Right to be in him, may be Passive Obedience. And if this be the Case, I have nothing to do but to beg of God to keep me in my Senses.

And that is abundantly sufficient to prevent imposing on, by such Arguments, the Author if he pleases may call white black, and heat cold: but if he do, sure he expects not to convince others of it, nor easily persuade them he believes it himself.

But then if fighting against and killing a King we have sworn Allegiance to, be not Passive Obedience, then by a Government thoroughly settled, the Convocation does not mean bare Possession of Power.

2. This Interpretation reproaches those Worthies of the Church of *England*, who suffered between the Years 42, and 60.

A very few Years since it would have been thought a high Degree of Madness for a Church of *England* Man to have doubted, who (in the late Times) acted most agreeably to the Principles of that Church in the Point of Allegiance and Government, either Archbishop *Fuxton*, Bishop *Cozens*, Bishop *Gunning*, &c. or *Hugh Peters*, Dr. *Owen*, or *John Goodwyn*. But now our Author hath clearly determined it for *Hugh*, and his Brethren, and against the Bishops. Now as ridiculous as this is, it is certainly the Case; for if the Author be right, all these Reverend and Excellent Men who were undone for their Loyalty, acted ignorantly or unsincerely; and those only who followed the several Revolutions, and adhered to them against the King, are the Men that acted according to the Principles of the Church of *England*; nay, even the *Regicides* themselves will put in for Church of *England* Men too; and (which is the strangest thing of all) even in point of Allegiance and Government. For that Government that appointed the High Court of Justice, had a full Possession of Power, and all Places of Trust, &c. were in their Hands, and at their disposal. And by reason of that they had a sufficient Authority, (even God's) by Commission from which they acted; and then all their Allegiance was justly transferred from the King to them: By Virtue of which they did but their Duty, but in acting under such a Commission from their Governors, and also in pursuing to death the Enemies and Competitors of that Government whose Subjects they were, and whose Security and Establishment they were bound to promote.

And is this no prejudice to this Interpretation? Must we part with our Senses, as well as our Principles? Is it possible for any Man to believe that

that *John Goodwyn* was a better Church of England Man, in Point of Allegiance and Government, than Doctor *Hammond*? Or that the Principles of the Church of England justify the Murther of *Charles the first*? I do not know of what weight this may be with the Author; but any Man, who had any respect for the Church of England, would have been a little cautious how he had fastened such a Sense upon the Words of such a Venerable Convocation, as should justify the most execrable Villany under the Sun, and reproach as great and worthy Men as ever were Members of it, and some of them probably Members of this Convocation, and condemn them in those very Instances which were the highest Evidences of their Vertues and Sincerity, and upon Account of which their Names and Memories will always be precious; and one single Example of such Men is of more value with all good Men, than that of a thousand Weather-Cock Divines, who can turn themselves and their Principles as there is occasion, and by the help of *Publick Good*, and a *Fetuitical* Distinction or two, can make them suit with any Power in the World.

Now Men (if they have a mind to it) may defend *Hugh Peters*, *Bradshaw*, and the *High Court of Justice*, and condemn their Judges and Juries for murdering honest Men, who did but their Duty. They may, if they will, applaud the Practices of *Nye*, *Marshall*, and *Milton*, and dislike those of the Glorious Sufferers for their King and their Consciences. And to bring for Principles of the Church of England that will do all this, is as ridiculous as it is shameless and impudent.

3. This Interpretation maintains an absurd, unreasonable, ungodly Do-

ctrine, and that is, *That the Permission of Providence is a Rule of Practice, and a sufficient Warrant to act contrary to the Rules of Right and Justice amongst Men.* This does not only naturally follow from this Interpretation, but the Author asserts the same almost in so many words: For going about to prove that the Revolution is God's doing, he tells us, (in Page 14, &c.) *That God's Providence in permitting, is a sufficient Indication of his Will and Pleasure, as to the Event.* And (saith he) *since Prophecy hath ceased, sure I am, that nothing but Providence is vocal to us.* I wonder what the Author thinks of Scripture, and Right, and Laws among Men; sure these are as vocal as Providence, and we are bound to make them the Rule of our Practices, and are so directed by God himself: But we have no Direction or Warrant to act by any Methods of Providence, contrary to them. The Author goes on, *Such strong Arguments may we produce from it, as will not with Ease or Ridicule be eluded.* But for all that I must tell our Author, That his Opinion as it is foolish, so it deserves to be laughed at; but as 'tis impious, to be execrated and abominated, as tending to the destruction of all Righteousness, and even of Human Society: For if Men must direct their Lives not by fixed and stated Rules, but by God's Permissions and Providential Occurrences, we should soon have a mad World on't, and Robbery, Rapine, Fraud, and Oppression, would be more to be observed than (nay against) Right, and Law, and even Scripture it self. But however the Author is so fond of his Notion, That he tells us, *He can't restrain his Pen from the moving of this Query: Whether the Manifest Interpositions of a Gracious Providence, that tends to the promoting*

moting of God's Honor, and to the Establishment of his Church, be not to us (now that Prophecy is ceas'd) a Justifiable Ground for any rational Man to act upon? i. e. against known Laws and the engagement of our Oaths (for otherwise it is not to the Authors Purpose;) and then with great Confidence adds, I think this will hardly be deny'd. What doth the Authour mean? or where does he live? Hardly be deny'd? Why it has been deny'd a thousand times over, and there is scarcely a Sermon that treats any thing of Providence, but denies it; and I do deny it, and the Author shall see what grounds I have for it: But I observe from the Author's Query,

1. That he takes too much upon him to determine the Interposition of Providence, as tending to God's Honor, and Establishment of his Church, (in the sense he would have it :) For the Author may know, if he please, That God's Honor is as much, and generally more promoted by the Patience and Sufferings of his People, than by their external Prosperity; especially if that Prosperity be gain'd, or endeavor'd to be gain'd, by undue means: It is not for the Honor of God to carve for our selves, to take such courses to secure us as he does not allow of, and to set up his Providence in Contradiction to his Laws. And the Constancy and Fidelity of Men, and especially of the Clergy, to their Principles, tends more to the Honor of Religion, and more recommends it to the World, than to change and turn them to all Times and Seasons; and the Church is better established upon the Foundation of Truth and Justice, than upon any worldly Power; or when she deserts these, and makes a Rule of Divine Permissions. The Author is very bold with Providence, and not

only makes the secret Things of God a Rule for common Behaviour, but determines them to what end he pleaseth. There is no doubt but that God will be glorified in all his Proceedings; but whether by such Interpositions of his Providence, he will bring Glory to himself, by the Patience and Fidelity of his Servants, or any other way, is more than the Author can know, and he must be very assuming, if he undertakes to determine.

2. As to the Author's main Query, Whether the Interpositions of Providence be not a justifiable Ground for a reasonable Man to act upon, let him answer it himself in this other Query: Whether, if a poor Man hath stoln his Neighbour's Purse, or (which is nearer to our Author) if a Thief hath stollen it, and given it him, may he keep it, though he knows it is stollen, and from whom? He is possessed of it by Providence, he did not steal it himself, and it is very gracious to him to supply the needs of himself and his poor Family. In such a Case I ask, may he honestly keep it? I suppose our Author will say No, and the Reason is because he can't lawfully do it. So then it is not the interposition of Providence, but the Lawfulness of the thing *that is the justifiable ground for a rational Man to act upon.*

But does not the Scripture and the Convocation Book, say that God is the Universal Monarch of the World, That he sets up and pulls down Kings, altereth, bestoweth, and transferreth Kingdoms?

Very true; and does not the same Scripture say That God is the Lord of all private Mens Estates, as well as of Kingdoms, and that he exalteth and depressoeth, that he maketh Rich and Poor, and altereth their Stations and

and Conditions, as seems best to the Divine Wisdom.

And is it not very foul to argue from hence? Therefore if any Man by the Permission of Providence, can corruptly, fraudulently, or forcibly, get his Neighbour's Goods, or Estate, into his Possession; why, he must have them: The Laws and Judges, and all Men else, must do what they can to keep him in Possession; for it is God's Will it should be so: For (saith our Authour, Page 14.) *God's Providence in permitting, is a sufficient Indication of his Will and Pleasure, as to the Event.* The Israelites, by God's express Direction spoiled the Egyptians; and therefore if any Man spoil his Neighbour, and get his Money or Jewels into his Hands, they are all his own: For our Authour is very sure, *since Prophecie hath ceased, Providence is only vocal to us; and he can from thence produce such strong Arguments as will not with ease be eluded.* And is not this pure Casuistical Divinity, and admirably fitted to promote Righteousness and Justice in the World? But if this hold not good in private Estates, I would fain have the Authour shew me a Reason why it does in Kingdoms? God hath the same Propriety, his Providence is the same, and the general Principles and Accounts of God's Proceedings in Scripture, are all one: And therefore if an Argument from Providence be not good, with respect to private Estates, neither is it with respect to Governments; and Right, and not Providence, must govern us in one Case, as well as the other.

The State of this Matter is plainly this: Where we are free, we may act upon the Interpositions of Providence, as we see occasion; but where we are already bound up by Oaths and Laws, their Obligation will hold us against all Providences,

(nakedly and barely considered,) and we cannot be discharged of them till God by his Providence hath so ordered and disposed Matters, as we may lawfully act without the Breach and Violation of them. When a Government is altered, and so as to acquire a Right to the Subjects Allegiance, in the fore-mentioned ways of Death, Cession, &c.) It is certain this comes by Providence, (and therefore justly and fitly ascribed to it.) But then the immediate Reason and Ground of Submission is not the Permission or Providence of God merely; but Providence proceeding so far, as to open a way that it may be done lawfully, and without prejudice to other Ties: In this Sense, we may follow the Direction of Providence, and become Subjects to a Government that Providence shall so set up. But this Sense will not serve our Authour's turn, and yet it is the same that he delivereth, though he doth not know it. He tells us in Page 15. *That without the Interpositions of Providence, Predictions themselves are not rashly to be executed; i. e. till Providence hath so cleared the way, as to make it lawful to put them in Execution.*

A little before he quotes a Passage out of the Convocation-Book, p. 47. *That the Success of Divine Benedictions (which afterwards he calls Predictions, as if Benedictions and Predictions were all one,) are to be left to the Disposition of God's Heavenly Providence.*

Now this Passage in the Convocation refers to Samuel's anointing David King, intimating thereby, that Samuel did not depose Saul, nor put David upon undue Means to gain the Crown, but left the Accomplishment of it to God's Providence, to clear and open a way for him, that he might lawfully take it. And it is plain so David understood it; for though

1 Sam. 24.
3. 8 & 26.
8. 9.

he was annointed King by God's expresse Commandment, (and that is somewhat more than by Providence,) yet that did not tempt him to act against his known Duty: And though God put Saul twice into his power, he did not think *that Providence a justifiable Ground to act upon*, and to take that advantage to make himself King, (and yet I take it, that was a great deal more than *Permission*.) And David's Followers urge it home, *And the men of David said unto him, behold the day which the Lord said unto thee, behold! I will give thine enemy into thine hand, that thou mayst do to him as shall seem good unto thee,* 1 Sam. 4. 4. And Abishai also said to David, *God hath delivered thine enemy into thy hand this day: now therefore let me smite him.* God had given his Enemy that pursued his Life into his hands, and here was a *gracious Providence to act upon*; God made him a Promise, and seemed to point out this as a means to accomplish it; and it must be confessed this is as plausible a Case as can be put. But David knew his Duty better, and though the Text expresses, and David owns, that it was from God, and that God did it, and that is by an active and not barely permissive Providence; yet he knew that was no Warrant for him to act against any Branch of his Legal Duty, but says expressly, *who can stretch forth his hand against the Lord's Annointed, and be guiltless?* It was against the Law to stretch forth his hand against the King, and no Interpositions of Providence, would make that Fact Innocent, he followed Providence as far as he lawfully might, and the Laws of the Kingdom permitted, but he durst not act upon it in Contradiction to them; and therefore he says to Abishai that would have killed Saul, *v. 10. the Lord shall smite him, or*

his day shall come to die, or he shall descend into battel and perish; that is, he left it to God's Providence, so to order and dispose of Things, and to bring it about in such a manner, as he might take the Crown without the Violation of any Duty that he owed, or of any former Engagement he had made to King Saul. Now when Providence proceeds in this manner, and so to make a clear passage to Submission, then, and then only it is a justifiable Ground to act upon. But to talk of Divine Permissions, as a sufficient Warrant to justify our Acting against Common Right, and known Laws, and the strongest Obligations, is certainly one of the wildest Assertions in the World.

I shall end this with the plain Judgment of Doctor Stillingfleet in this matter: *The great Revolutions of Government are attributed to the particular Providence of God; God is the Commons Judge, he pulleth down one and setteth up another; which doth not found any Right of Dominion, (which some have said, 'till the Argument from Providence was returned with greater force upon themselves;) but it shews, that when God pleases to make use of Persons or Nations, as the Scurges in his Hand to punish a People with, He gives them Success above their Hopes or Expectations; But that Success gives them no Right.* 3d Edit.

For a Conclusion I shall add one Thing more, and which of it self alone is sufficient to shew the Folly of our Authour's Interpretation, and that is, That (beside the many Absurdities and Contradictions that attend it,) it is contrary to the expresse Doctrine and Declaration of the Members of that Convocation. Now I take it for granted, that they understood the Sense of the Convocation a little

On Nov. 5.
1613.
p. 939.
2d Edit.
1631.

a little better than our Authour. I take it likewise for granted, That what they had determined for Doctrine in a publick and solemn Way, and in Convocation, they would neither contradict, nor yet deliver the clean contrary in their particular Writings. But then it will follow, that our Authour's Interpretation, and the Doctrine built on it is a new Invention, and never heard of in the Church of England, till very lately. Bishop Andrews, a very Eminent and Learned Member of that Convocation, in a Sermon preached before the King, but three Years after the ending of it, upon these Words, *Per me Reges regnant*, By me Kings reign, (*Prov. 8. 15.*) tells us, That the act Regnant is twofold; Some are Reges, Kings; and yet reign not, (*as True Heirs defeated,*) and some reign, and are no Kings, (*as do all Usurpers on the Throne, per Fas Nefasque,*) always one thing it is to be King, another to reign; Joash was true King all those six years he reigned not; Athaliah reigned all those six years, yet true Queen she never was any. Of such God saith, *Hof. 8. 9.* Regnaverunt, sed non à me. Why? For per me Reges regnant, By me Kings reign; Kings of lawful and true Descent, they reign by me. These were none such, so they reigned without any per, from me; but when these meet, and they that be Reges de Jure, regnant de Facto, then it is as it should be, and per me it is that they so meet.

Bishop Buckeridge, Bishop of Rochester, (in his Book written in the Defence of Barclay, which Book was probably written some part of it in the time of this Convocation, for it is a very Elaborate Work, and was Printed 1614.) layeth this down as a general Doctrine: There is a great

difference between a Tyrant reigning by a lawful Title, and a Tyrant without Right and Title, and invading the Kingdom by force. If a lawful King exercise Tyranny, he cannot be compelled by the Bishops, or Nobles, or People, &c. for such a Tyrant being in the throne

by a Just Title, is ordained of God, and he who resists him, resists the Ordinance of God: But if any Man snatcheth the Kingdom by Force and Tyranny, he is not a King, but an Enemy, and it is lawful for any of the People to do the same to him, as they may do to an Enemy. This is plain enough, but yet there is more in that Chapter no less observeable. Belarmine had objected the Quiet Possession of Athaliah for six years. To which the Bishop answers, How quiet soever it was, it was violent, (*for she was guarded with*

Soldiers,) But what are six years to make a good Title of Prescription, and Possession, which, according to Gregory Tholoanus, ought to be the Possession of an hundred years or more; and what are six years to an hundred? Athaliah therefore had not acquired a Right to the Crown, neither by the Consent of the People, nor by the Prescription of six Years, but being a mere Usurper, and no Queen, she might be deposed. And so we have not only the Sense of this Right Reverend Learned Prelate, that an Usurped Possession of the Crown cannot Claim our Allegiance, but also we have his Sense of a thorough Settlement (in one kind,) and that is when a Right to the Government is acquired by a Prescription, and that is a long and uninterrupted Possession joined with

Dispar vero est ratio Tyranni legitimo jure regnantis, & Tyranno sine jure & titulo Regnum per Vim & Tyrannidem occupantis, &c. Rossin. in rebus Temp. de Potestate Papæ, p. 919.

At sex annos quiete regnavit & possessio ista est quietæ, &c. p. 911;

the Consent of the People. And so it follows a little after, when in answer to Bellarmine's Objecting other Governments, which in their beginnings were Violent and Tyrannical, but afterwards became lawful, as that of the Cæsars, the Goths, and Lombards, he says, That

Imper'a jure Belli
acquisita, Temporis
Præscriptione legiti-
ma fieri solent. Ibid.

Governments acquired by
the right of War, by Pre-
scription they usually be-
come lawful. But then
by Prescription it is plain

he does not mean a quiet Possession of six, nor many more Years, but when thereby a Right to the Government is acquired; and consequently our Authour's full Possession of Dignities, Prerogatives, &c. to which our Allegiance is due, is a Notion that before now never saw Light among the true Sons of the Church of England.

To these Right Reverend Prelates I crave leave to add a worthy and learned Authour, who also wrote many Learned Tracts about these times, and he is Doctor Jackson, who hath fully declared his own and the Church of England's Judgment in this very Point. He puts these two Questions: *How far any Man which without Title doth take upon him, and by Fraud and Violence gets opportunity to exercise Royal Authority over them may be resisted? The second is: Whether He that by just Title is invested with Royal Power may be resisted in the Unjust and Tyrannical Exercises of it?*

P. 960.
3 T. last
Edit.

To these two Questions the Answer hath been long since given, by some Moral Philosophers, and approved of by best Divines.

1. He who is a mere Usurper, or a Tyrant by Title, may be resisted by Violence, even to Deposition, or Death, albeit he happens to exercise his Power

with such Moderation, as would become a Just and Lawful King. He that is a King, or supreme Magistrate, by just and lawful Title, may not be thus resisted, albeit he exercise his Power Tyrannically; touching the former it is a Truth unquestionable, That a Tyrant by Title, or a mere Usurper of supreme Power, or an Intruder into the Office Royal, may be resisted, without resisting the Ordinance of God, and the Reason is plain; for that he could never usurp or continue his Power otherwise than by resisting some higher Powers, or by resisting the Ordinance of God. And among others he Instances, In case he usurps or exercises Royal Authority over such as have been formerly governed by Royal Succession, he openly resists Power much higher than his own, whether this Power be yet actually annex'd to some known Persons that have Right or Titles to the Kingdom by Succession, or not. 'Tis true, he says this Resistance may not be made by every body; but he says it likewise with this Qualification, *Save in the Right and Interest of the Right Heir, or by his Commission and Command.*

And the same he says a little after, (Page 968.) when he answers to the Example of Jehoiada's deposing of Athaliah, urged by the Papists for the Power of the Pope to depose Kings. The Power Royal or Supreme was by Right annexed to the Infant Prince, as being next Heir; and Jehoiada deposed her who by Force and Violence had usurped the Royal Scepter. Is it then all one in these Mens Divinity, for a Subject or Peer of any Realm to stand for the Right of his Liege Lord; and for the ancient Liberties of his Native Country against a Stranger, or Usurper? And for a Stranger no Native Member of this or the like Christian Commonweal, to throw down the lawful King from his Throne?

Throne ? or to authorise his Subjects or others to do to him as Jehoiada did to Athaliah ? And to bring in a Stranger or Alien, as he to cast out a Stranger or Usurper.

These Testimonies are clear enough, of the Doctrine that was own'd by the Convocation, and by that Age, and I could add many more, particularly of Bishop Merton, who not only taught but practised this Doctrine, being himself a Sufferer under the Revolution begun in 42. and of Doctor Field, then Dean of Worcester, and many others, who have said the same; but this would be to write a *New History of Passive Obedience*, And I think I may challenge our Author or any Man else, to shew me one single Instance, not only of any Member of that Convocation, but of any approved Author of the Church of *England*, and of that, or any other Age, but (either discoursing *ex professo* of Usurpation, or *in transitu* speaking of it,) what hath delivered always the very same Doctrine.

The Authour (in ridiculous Cant) tells us in Page 1, 2. *Since Bishop Overall's Convocation Book we plead Reason and Authority.* But I tell him in his own Language, That we have not only got a whole Convocation of unprejudiced and learned Men, but the same unprejudiced and learned Men out of Convocation, and all the learned Men of that Age, and of all others of the Church of *England*, who were removed from any Temptations, and the fittest and most fair Judges to determine, that have unanimously and expressly condemned the Notions and Assertions of our Author, and of all that hold the same.

I conclude with one Request to our Author, That when the next fit of Demonstrations takes him, he will be pleased to demonstrate this same thing from the *History of Passive Obedience*; and to encourage him, I can assure him, That Obedience and Submission, &c. will be as easily demonstrated from the *History of Passive Obedience*, as from *Bishop Overall's Convocation-Book*.

F I N I S.

Postscript.

Since the finishing of this, Doctor *Sherlock* hath publish'd the Reasons that induced him to take the Oath; He proceeds upon the same Grounds with this Author, and what is here said (as to the main) is equally of Force against both, and will serve to Vindicate the *Convocation-Book*, as well from the False Interpretation of the Dr. as of the Author. I shall not now stand (nor does it concern my present Purpose) to Examine all the Arguments the Dr. makes use of, (but that will be done in due time:) But I shall fully further Consider what he urges from the Convocation, and is not mentioned by the Author, and shall also Clear these Assertions deliver'd in the Answer, from such things as may be rais'd in Objection to them, from the Dr's Book. And in Examining these, I shall have Occasion to Consider, and shall thereby shew the Weakness of the Fundamental Principles that he proceeds upon. I Observe then:

I. That the Interpretation of the Words of the Convocation in both, is the very same: But there is some Difference as to the manner of proposing it. The Author is doubtful and modest; He cannot but conceive, and with Submission, That a Government is settled, when the whole Administration of Affairs, and all Places of Trust, &c. are in the Hands of the Prince. But the Dr. is very confident of it, it is as plain, as every body can see it; and (saith he) If this be not a settled Government, I despair of ever knowing

what it is. Now it must be remembered, Preface. that the Dr. owns, that in this Book he hath renounc'd one of his Principles, and the whole Book is an Evidence, and an Acknowledgment, that he hath been very much mistaken, and hath continued a great while under the Power of those Mistakes. And so soon, and in the same Book to be again so full of Assurance, and to challenge People to Answer him! The Principle that he now renounceth, yea, and all the Principles he now disputes against, (though he calls it softly *Declaring his own Thoughts*) yet he did Preface. assert with as much Peremptoriness as any thing in this new Book: And why should he then despair of knowing any other Notion of a settled Government, besides his own; perhaps, (if no body could inform him) the Dr. hereafter might himself find out another Notion of it; for what hath been, may be: In the mean time, there is another Notion of it deliver'd above, and which is more agreeable to the Rules of Truth and Justice, and to the common Acceptation of these Words among Men. And let the Dr. shew me any one Approved Lawyer, or Civilian, (who are suppos'd to speak the most properly in such Matters) or any Historian that ever deliver'd such a Sense of those Words, Arg. or that ever affirm'd, or in a meer Narratory way, declar'd, That an Usurped Possession, was a Thorough Settlement, or any Settlement at all, when there was a Rightful and Legal Title

tle in being against it, and that Title actually contesting. Let him shew me (in the particular Instance) any approved Author, that ever said, That *Tyrannus sine Titulo*, (as is the Case the Dr. puts in his Book) was a Government thoroughly settled, or any True Government at all. The Dr. expressly asserts, That the Providence of God alters no Legal Rights, nor forbids those who are dispossessed of them, to recover their Right when they can; which (by the way) is strange Doctrine: For why does not God's Authority in the Possessor, (if he have it) bind the Dispossessed King as well as the People? and is somewhat strange that when God divests a King of his Government, he has still a Right to it, and may justly recover it: This tends mightily to the Peace of Societies, (one of the Drs. Arguments.) The Case of the Kings the Convocation speaks of as dispossessed by God was quite otherwise, they had no Right left, as when *Jehu* was Anointed, *Foram* became his Subject. Bet it must be confessed those Wise Men never thought of the Drs. Hypothesis and new Notions: But to the purpose, the dispossessed King according to the Dr. hath still a Legal Right, and by vertue of which he may recover his Throne. Then I say, so long as the Case is so, and the Pretensions to Right still in dispute, the contrary Government can never be said to be thoroughly settled; when there is a prosecution, but of a pretended Right, it cannot fairly be said, that such a Possession is thoroughly settled, but when there is a plain, visible, and indisputable Legal Right against a Possessor, and that Right actually prosecuted, in such a case to call bare Possession, a thorough settlement, is one of the strangest things in the World; and if that be a settlement, all the World have hitherto been mistaken about it, and we are beholden to the Dr. for his new Discovery of a Settlement. As

Pag. 26.

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Pag. 46.

for his new Doctrine about Providence,

2. The Doctor says, That the Convocation speaks of the Subjection of the *Israelites* to the *Moabites* and *Aramites*, and to the Kings of *Aegypt* and *Babylon*, as their duty, and that they were bound to it, and from thence concludes the sense of the Convocation to be, That Princes, who have no Legal Right may have Gods Authority, and ought to be obey'd. For saith he, the *Moabites* and *Aramites* never could have a Legal Right to the Government of *Israel*, and the *Aegyptian*, and *Babylonish* Kings never had any Legal Right: Now but Three Pages off, the Dr. tells us, That the Submission of the Prince may be thought necessary to transfer a Legal Right; and then all these Governments had a Legal Right to the Government of *Israel*: As to *Babylon*, the Dr. tells us, there was Gods express Command for their Submission, and *Nebuchadnezzar* carried the Princes Captive with him, and I think there is no great doubt of their Submission, and especially if they were sensible that God Commanded it. As to *Aegypt*, what Government the *Jews* had then among them does not appear; but what ever Government they had, Or, whoever they had for their Governours, it is plain they Submitted to the Kings of *Aegypt* as well as all the People; And the Convocation expressly affirms they did so. And the Case is the same with respect to the *Moabites* and *Aramites*; whatever Governours they had, they and the people Submitted; and the Convocation is as express as can be; They knew it was not Lawful to take Arms against the Kings whose Subjects they were. What! Subjects without Submission! and this the Dr. quotes too out of them; but then I wonder upon what grounds he said they could have no Legal Right to Govern *Israel*; for if the Submission of the Prince can Transfer a Legal Right, then they had a Legal Right, and then

pag. 6:

pag. 9.

pag. 58.

pag. 51.

to

to be sure they could have what they actually had. If it be said that God was at that time their Sovereign, and He did not submit; it is true He did not, but the Text says expressly, that God deliver'd them into their Hands. But then this would be an Argument against their Submission; For the Dr. tells us, that where God entails the Crown, the People were not to submit to any Usurper, if the Right Heir was alive; and therefore much more where God himself was their King, and then sure they might lawfully resist these Kings. whose Subjects they were not, nor could be, and they needed no especial Commission or Direction, to destroy the Usurpers as *Abud* did *Aeglon*, but they might, Nay, they were bound to do it, as *Jehoiada* slew *Athaliah*. For I hope God's Entail is not of greater force than his own immediate Government; so that either their Submission Transferr'd a Legal Right, or else their Submission was a sin.

Pag. 5.

The Dr. asserts, That the Convocation speaks of *Illegal* and *Usurped* Powers; But the Dr's Proofs from them are only of *Legal* Powers. And consequently, that only Legal Powers have God's Authority, and a Government is then thoroughly settled, when it becomes Legal. The Dr. will not, but the Convocation distinguishes between the means of acquiring a Power, and the Power it self; the means of acquiring Power may be very unjust and *Illegal*, and yet the Power afterwards may be very *Legal*. But the Dr. is resolv'd they must be all one, and because the Convocation speaks of the Ambition of Encroaching Kings, and the Rebellion of Subjects, as a means whereby Governments have been alter'd, therefore by a Government being *thoroughly settled*, they must needs mean Usurped Powers. As if it was impossible, for such beginnings afterwards to acquire a Right, and so Terminate in a Legal Title, and Till

that is, the Government is... the Rebellion and Encroachment: And a man cannot justly become a party to the Government, no more than to the Rebellion, for they are both equally unjust, except the Dr. thinks that stealing a purse is very unjust, but the keeping it after it is stoln, is very just. I will grant the Dr. that a Government, by what ill means soever attain'd, may have God's Authority, and be thoroughly settled; But then I say, it has not God's Authority, nor is thoroughly settled, till it stands upon the Foundation of *Right*, and becomes *Legal*. The Convocation never mentions Usurpation, or, Usurper, name or thing, but in one place, and that is the Case of *Athaliah*, and they plainly condemn it, and justify the killing her; but in the other instances of Government in that Book, a Legality is implied; or in express Terms affirm'd, *chap. 31.* it is said when *Alexander* was dead, the *Jews* were free, *none of his* Pag. 66.
Captains having any Lawful Interest, or Title to Judah; plainly intimating that *Alexander* himself, and the *Persian* before him, had a Lawful Interest, and Title; and they likewise tell us of the *Romans*, that they were the *Lawful* Pag. 82.
Magistrates of the Jews. But nothing will serve the Doctor's turn, but the Power must be as unjust as the means; and if it was granted him, I wonder what he would make of it. That would certainly be a very odd reason, for Subjection, he that partakes with Injustice, (as he certainly does that joyns with it) partakes with the guilt too. And if the Power be unjust, then to abet, to defend, support and maintain that Power must be unjust likewise. The Dr's shift of Legal Rights, and God's Rights will stand him in no stead, for that will serve all Cases as well as his; God hath a Right to take away any mans life, or estate, as well as a Throne. But if this be done by *Illegal Ways*, it is not God's Right and

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Sovereignty that hinders, but we are bound to pursue the Wicked Instruments, and to bring them to Punishment; and whoever adheres to them is a Thief and a Murderer equal to them. And if we forsake the Laws and the plain Rules of Practice, and apply our Elves to Providences and God's Rights of Creation, we must be forced to quit Truth and Justice, and adhere to a company of Thieves, Lyars, and Murderers.

3. To the Case of *Joash* and *Athaliah*, the Dr. gives two Answers.

Page. 34.

1. The first is this: *All that this Story amounts to is no more than this, That when a Legal and Rightful Heir is actually possessed of the Throne, the Subjects may return to their allegiance, and by his Authority prosecute the Usurper, &c.* I answer, The Story amounts to a great deal more; and that is, That Subjects may set the Rightful Heir upon the Throne, altho it be in the actual Possession of an Usurper; for so *Jehoiada*, and the People did: they set up the Right Heir, and ejected the Usurper, tho she had been in the Possession of the Throne for six Years. But (saith the Dr.) *The Rightful Heir was actually possessed of the Throne, for Joash was first Anointed and Proclaimed, before any one stirred a finger against Athaliah.* But is the Dr. sure that *Joash* was actually Possessed of the Throne? He was Anointed indeed: But is Anointing actual Possession? and it will not be easie to prove it according to the Drs. Notion of Possession, of having the whole Administration of Affairs, and all the Authority of the Kingdom in his hands, for sure *Athaliah* had some: But however, who Anointed? and who Proclaimed him? And who put him in Possession? Why truly no body else but his own Subjects, and these very men that had lived six Years under the Usurper. And then I perceive that Subjects may stand by the Rightful Heir against an Usurper,

tho Possessed of the Throne for some Years. But then, Where is that Fidelity, Allegiance and Obedience, that the Dr. says we are bound to pay to Usurped Powers? But for all that, the Dr. goes on and says, *Now this is a very different Case from raising Rebellion against a Prince; who is in the Possession of the Throne, to restore an ejected one.* And I pray where is this difference? A Man must open his Eyes wide, that can see it; Was not *Athaliah* in the Possession of the Throne when *Jehoiada* Anointed *Joash*? The Dr. may call this Rebellion if he please, and *Athaliah* called it Treason, and perhaps upon the Drs. Principles: But for all that *Jehoiada* and the People did their duty to their Rightful Prince, and slew her that was in Possession of the Throne. And that I suppose is no great sign that they thought Possession of the Throne by Providence was God's Authority, or that Allegiance was due upon that account. I know there is a difference between Anointing a New King, and Restoring an Ejected one. But the Question is concerning Allegiance to an Usurper in the Possession of the Throne, and as to that there is no difference. For these pay as little Allegiance to an Usurper, who Anoint a King, and then Depose him, as those who do it to restore an Ejected one: And I would fain know what difference there is (as to Allegiance to an Usurper) between Anointing a New King, and upon his Authority dispossessing an Usurper, and doing the same thing upon the Authority of one already Anointed.

2. His other Answer is, *That God himself had intail'd the Kingdom of Judah on the Posterity of David, and therefore nothing could justify their Submission to an Usurper when the Kings Son was found; but in other Kingdoms where Entails are made by Providence, there the placing a Prince*

in the Throne, is a Reason to submit to him as God's Ordinance and Minister.

To this I answer :

1. This Distinction is not in the *Convocation Book*, and so it does not affect their Sense : They do not speak with reference to it, when they call *Athaliah* an Usurper, and justify the Proceedings of *Jehoiada* and the People against her ; but the Reason they give is general, *The Right Heir of the Kingdom being alive*, which extends to all Kingdoms, that are entail'd, and go by Succession : And it is plain they thought of no such Difference as to this matter : but that a thorough Settlement of a Government (and tho attain'd by the same ill means) was the same thing, and had God's Authority in *Judah* as well as any other Nation, as in the Instances of the *Babylonians*, *Macedonians* and *Romans*, whose Government over the *Jews* was not attained by honest means than *Athaliah's*, and was as much contrary to the entail upon *David's* House, as hers ; and yet they justify and require Obedience to them, but justify the slaying of her : And therefore it is plain, that by a thorough Settlement they do not mean a full Possession of Power, for *Athaliah* had as full a Possession of Power in the Kingdom of *Judah*, as had the *Babylonians*, *Macedonians*, or *Romans*, nor do they reckon God's Entail upon *David's* Posterity any ground of Difference in this matter, for the Government of *Judah* by *Babylonians* was as much contrary to that Entail, as the Government of *Athaliah*.

2. The Drs. Arguments will equally justify Submission to *Athaliah* in the Kingdom of *Judah*, notwithstanding such entail, as to an Usurper in any other Nation. I shall instance in two ; his Argument from Providence, and his Argument from the necessity of Government for the Preservation of Human Society.

1. His Arguments from Providence: These equally fit *Athaliah*, and she had the same Pretensions to Providence as any other Usurper hath or can have :

The Dr. tells us expressly, *That it makes no difference in this Case to distinguish between what God permits, and what he does ; for this distinction, does not relate to the events of things ; but to the Wickedness of Men, which God only permits ; but the events of all things are in his hands, and are ordered and disposed by his Will and Council, as they must be, if God governs the world.* Now according to this Doctrin, *Athaliah's* Usurpation was the Act of God, and as much so as any other Usurpation : *Her wicked Counsels and Designs* God only permitted, as he does those of other Usurpers ; but her actual Possession of the Throne was what God appointed, and was as much ordered and disposed by his Decree and Council, as that of any Usurper in the whole World. Farther, the Dr. says, *If there were such a Distinction, we ought in reason to ascribe the Advancement of Kings to God's decree and council, because it is the principal act of Providence which has so great an influence on the Government of the world ; and if he decree and order any events, certainly he peculiarly orders such events as will do most good, or most hurt to the world.* And this fits *Athaliah's* Case as well as any other ; and it seems her Advancement to the Throne was not only God's Decree, but his Peculiar Decree and Order ; for that event as well as any other Usurpation, had a great influence, and might do much good or hurt in the World. Farther yet according to this Doctrine, the Dr. says, *That ALL Kings (and then sure *Athaliah* among the rest) are equally Rightful with respect to God ; for those are all Rightful Kings, who are placed in the Throne by God, (as *Athaliah* was) and it is impossible there should be a wrong King, unless a Man could make him-*

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self King whether God will or no. Now I only suppose, that *Athaliah* could not do what is *Impossible*, nor (if she had never so much mind to it) could she make her self *Queen whether God would or no.* The Doctor further adds, *He is our King who is settled in the Throne in the actual Administration of Sovereign Power, for King is the Name of Power and Authority, not of mere Right.* Now *Athaliah* had the actual Administration of Sovereign Power, and therefore according to the Dr. she was *Queen* by God's Authority, tho not by the Law of the Land, and Allegiance must be due to her as well as to any other. And all the Drs. Arguments are as conclusive and valid for Submission to *Athaliah*, as for Submission to any Body else: But if these Reasonings be naught with respect to her, so are they also with respect to any other Usurpation; for if these be not certain Signs of God's Decree and Council, That a Person so possessed of the Throne, should be own'd as King, and submitted to, then they are no Rule for us; if they are, then they were a Rule for the *Jews*, and 'tis mere trifling to talk of God's entailing the Crown, as if God was tied any more to the entails of his own making, than he is to human Entails, and his own Decrees and Orders would not cut off his own Entails, as well as those of men. If the Possession of the Throne by Providence be a clear and demonstrative Evidence, that such a Person hath God's Authority, and that God would have him obeyed as King, then it's so notwithstanding any Entail made by himself: But then, if it be not such a demonstrative Evidence, not only the Doctor's Distinction is useless to his purpose, but all his Arguments are unconvincive and signifie nothing.

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2. His Argument drawn from the necessity of Government to the preservation of Human Society; now I

suppose the Dr. will grant me, that the People of *Judah* were a Human Society, and then there is not one Argument the Dr. uses, but what will equally conclude for submission to *Athaliah* as to any other Usurper, and the Dr. here argues from the nature of the thing, which is equally the same in all Governments. Now the Dr. tells us, That *Human Societies must not dissolve into a Mobile, or Mr. Hobbs's state of Nature, because the Legal Prince has lost his Throne, and can no longer Govern. For the end of Civil Government, is the safety and tranquillity of Human Societies, and whatsoever is necessary and useful to this end, becomes a duty.* Now the safety of the *Jewish Society* was as much the end of that Government as of any other, and if for the preservation of Human Society, it be necessary to submit to an Usurper, it was likewise necessary for the People of *Judah* to submit to *Athaliah*, but it was not necessary for their preservation, or if that necessity would not justify their Submission to an Usurper in that Kingdom, then it is plain that such a Submission cannot be warranted from the ends of Government, let these ends be what they will. It is not to be doubted but men may do some things for the preservation of a Society while they are under an Usurper; but that will not serve the Drs. turn, except they go through with the matter, and do every thing that is due to a Rightful King. Bishop *Sanderfon* owns it lawful to pay some kind of submission, as to defend the Country against a Foreign Enemy, to preserve Trade and Commerce, &c. But without any regard to the Authority of the Usurper or his Laws; for he has no Authority, and his Laws do not oblige in Conscience, &c. Now the Dr. tells us, *He cannot be of his mind, for if the safety and tranquillity of Human Societies require any thing of us, it both requires and justifies a great deal* Pag. 39.

deal more: Well, whatsoever it requires, I hope it required as much in the Kingdom of *Judah* as any where else. And by that we shall easily discern the force of the Dr's Argument.

1. He says, *As the Bishop states the matter, this destroys Civil Government, and a governed society, for here is neither King nor Subject, no Authority to Command, nor duty to obey, and no man will call this a Civil Government, or society to which Authority, and Obedience is Essential.* Well now, I ask the Dr. what must the Subjects of *Judah* do, *Athaliah* had got the Possession of the Throne for six years, and what would become of Society all that while? why 'tis plain as can be, they must own her Authority, and pay Allegiance to her: For says the Dr. *If Human Societies must be preserv'd, then the necessities of government give Authority to the Prince, and lay an Obligation of Duty on the Subject: if God will preserve Human Societies, we must conclude, that when he removes one King out of the Throne, he gives his Authority to him, whom he places there; for without Authority, Human Societies must disband.* This methinks is very bold, as if God had no other way of preserving Human Society, but according to our fancies, and Scheme of *Politicks*, but however it concludes sufficiently against the Dr. for if Human Society cannot be preserv'd, but by the Authority of an Usurper, and if God will preserve Human Society, it must be concluded that he hath given his Authority to him that Possesses the Throne, then he had given his Authority to *Athaliah*, or else all these dreadful consequences must follow, and the Society of *Judah* must disband, and come to nothing. But then if it did not necessarily follow, that such strange things must come to pass in the 6 years of *Athaliah's* Usurpation; or however that that was not a sufficient Reason for Transferring their Allegiance to her,

then 'tis plain that the Dr's. Argument, from the Nature of the thing is not true, Nor does he conclude rightly from it. And the Case is the same in what follows.

2. *I would ask (says he) whether the Care of my own preservation, and publick duty, &c. do oblige me in Conscience to obey, and submit to the Government, and the Prince, who governs, and to wish, and pray for, and do my utmost to endeavour their prosperity; if it does, this is the same with Allegiance, and then we may swear it too; if not, then I am at liberty to disturb the Government; and how (says the Dr.) does this contribute to the safety, and Tranquillity of Human Societies?* That question it does not concern me to answer; But this I say, that if it proves that we are bound in Conscience, for the safety of Societies, to pray for, and to endeavour the prosperity of an Usurped Government; it proves also that the people of *Judah*, were oblig'd in Conscience to do the same for *Athaliah*; and if it does not prove that, then it does not prove, that the Tranquillity of Human Society is a sufficient Reason to Oblige men in Conscience, to Submit to, to pray for, and to endeavour the Prosperity of an Usurper.

3. *Suppose the Government should not think it self safe, to leave all Men at liberty to disturb it, but should require an Oath of Fidelity, which is the Universal Practice of all Governments, what should the Subjects of Judah do in this Case? Why truly there is no remedy, they must e'en swear, for the Dr. tells us, Should every Man refuse the Oath, and the Prince had Power enough to compel, what must be the effect of this, but the utter Ruin, and destruction of the Nation.* But then if all this, and ten times more would not prove, that the People of *Judah* might lawfully swear Allegiance to *Athaliah*, then it will prove that the Dr. is mistaken in his Argument, and nothing can be concluded.

cluded from it. I shall pass over his next Reason, which notwithstanding is equally applicable to the same purpose, and come to his

ag. 42. 5. Which is concerning the presumed consent of the ejected Prince. Now (says the Dr.) *If we will presume, we should presume all that is reasonable, i. e. all that is necessary for the preservation of his Subjects, when he can Govern them no longer, and then we may presume his consent to Oaths of Allegiance*; all this I hope may be presumed as well in Judah, as any other Country. But now the Dr. comes to Clench the Business, *and tho he will not meddle with that Question, whether a King leaving his Kingdoms in a fright be Abdication*; yet this (saith he) *one may reasonably presume, that a King who forsakes his Kingdom to consult his own safety, will give his Subjects leave to consult theirs*; if this will justify a King to save himself by leaving his Kingdom, why will it not justify Subjects, when their King has left them, to submit and comply with the prevailing Powers, as far as is necessary to preserve themselves? That is, even by Oaths of Allegiance, if that be necessary. Now let us Transfer this to the Kingdom of Judah, Athalia had killed as many of the Kings Children as she could find, to make way for her self; and Joash was taken away to save his life. And therefore the People of Judah might Consult their safety, and to save their Places, and Preferments, might become her Subjects, and pay her the same Allegiance as was due to the most Lawful Prince in the World, and swear an Oath of Fidelity to her to defend her against all Men, even against him, whom they own'd, and acknowledg'd had the Right to the Throne. For (saith the Dr.) *Self-preservation is as much a Law to Subjects as to the Prince*. But then, if it does not prove that, then the Bishop is in the Right, and the Dr. in the wrong.

And whatever else we may do to preserve the Societies, and our selves, We may not swear Allegiance, nor own the Authority of an Usurper.

And now are not these pure Arguments? The Instance the Dr. pretends to answer, sets them in a clear light, and discovers the fallacy of them better than any trains of Discourse. The Dr. knows, that an Argument that proves too much, is as faulty as one that proves too little: Every body sees that they prove nothing in that case that has respect to them, and therefore they prove nothing in ours, and with respect to us; for there is not one Argument (if it have any force) but what equally concludes for their submission to an Usurper, as for us; for the ends of Government are the same in all Countries, and self Preservation, and Preservation of Society, and the necessity of Government in order to it. All these are the same with respect to Judah as to any other Society, for I hope Gods entail did not make the preservation of the Society to be a less duty in them than in others. If it be said the Providence of God will take care in such extraordinary cases, I say so too; but then this is Universal likewise, and the Dr. who hath talked so much of Providence, might have let us have some of it here, where 'tis seasonable & proper and the Application true; in all such streights and difficulties, we must refer our selves to Gods Providence, to find out a way for the safety of our selves and the Society, and not make a way for our selves, and act unwarrantably; and I am certain we have more ground to hope that God will preserve us and our Society, by keeping strictly to our duty, than by taking up unjustifiable methods of our own. A Kingdom can hardly be supposed to be in greater streights in this matter, than the Kingdom of Judah was all those six Years of Athaliah's Usurpation, but for all that, these formidable businesses, of *disbanding Societies, of ruining a Nation*

Nation, was no reason at all for their swearing to her; but they trusted Gods Providence, and so must we, which (as the Dr. can tell us when it serves his turn) *takes care of all extraordinary Cases, and there we must leave them.*

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What follows in the Dr. is mighty fine: *He does not think that Protection and Allegiance; but he thinks Government and Allegiance are such relatives, as the one cannot subsist without the other, if the Prince cannot Govern, the People cannot Obey; and therefore forsooth, because they cannot obey him, they must fight against him, and kill him, and do their utmost to ruin him: for saith he, As far as he quits his Government he quits their (his Subjects) Allegiance, and leaves his Subjects as he does his Crown, to be possessed by another; that is, so soon as Joash was taken away and hid, the Subjects were forthwith discharged of their Allegiance to him, and they as well as his Crown, were to be possessed by Athaliah; for as the Dr. says, He may have a Legal Right to both, but he cannot actually have the Subjects Allegiance without the Crown; nor can Subjects pay him their Allegiance without his being restored to the Possession of his Throne, no more than they can obey, when he cannot command.* Now the Dr. tells us, *This is as certain as any Proposition in Logic:* And for all that, it is as plain a fallacy as ever I met with, and the instance before us lays it open, and I ask the Dr. Was the Reitoring Joash to the Throne an Act of their Allegiance or no? If not, What Duty was it? But if it was, then Allegiance follows the Person of the King, tho he be out of the Possession of the Throne. I know the Dr. tells us, *That JOASH was first Anointed, and Proclaimed before any one stirred a finger against ATHALIAH;* But if that made any alteration in the

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matter, had *Athaliah* come but an hour sooner, the Subjects must have been all her own, (for she was in Possession of the Throne) and were bound in Conscience to stand by her, and if she required it to have knocked Joash on the head, as a Capital Enemy to her Government. But the Dr. knows well enough, that his Anointing and Proclaiming did not make him King, but that (according to the Rules of Succession in that and other Kingdoms) he was King all the time of *Athaliah's* Usurpation, and Allegiance was due to him, and upon the account of that they restored him. And then it follows, that Allegiance is due to a Prince, tho his Throne be possessed by an Usurper. The Foundation the Dr. builds all this upon is a mistake, *And that is, That Government and Allegiance are such Relatives as do MUTUO SE PONERE ET TOLLERE.* Now by Government the Dr. means the actual Administration of it. And then Government and Allegiance are so far from being such Relatives, that they are no Relatives at all, they are only the Acts of Relatives, and to say the Acts of Relatives are Relatives, is so far from being as certain, as any Proposition in Logic, that it is Logical Non-sence; it is to say that the Actual Government of a Master, and the Obedience of Servants are Relatives; so that, if a Master be Spirited away, or taken Captive, so as he can give no Directions in his Family, nor Actually Govern it, his Servants immediately cease to be his Servants, and the Relation is extinct, and when in some time after he recovers his Liberty and returns to his Family, he finds his House thrown out at windows, or his Servants flown, or his Family bestowed upon another Master that will Govern it, for they have nothing to do with him; the Relation was only between his Actual Govern-

Government and their Obedience: And saith the Dr. *When one of the Relatives is lost, the Relation is destroy'd, and nothing but the Memory of it left.* The Relation is only between King and Subject, and the Actual Administration of Government of the one hand and paying Allegiance on the other, are but the Acts of that Relation, and Consequential to it, but are not Relatives themselves; nor do they, *mutuo se ponere & tollere*; if a Subject is taken Captive, or otherwise hindered from paying Actual Allegiance, is the Relation lost, and does he therefore immediately Cease to be a Subject? And therefore neither doth a King; if he be hinder'd from the Actual Administration of Government, cease to be a King; but hath the same Right to our Allegiance, in and out of Possession: Allegiance was due to *Joash*, before he Actually Administred the Government; Nay, when an Usurper Actually Administred it, and so it was to *David*, tho he fled out of the Country.

Before I have done with this instance, there is another thing to be remark'd from it; the Dr. in his Preface tells us concerning Schism, that the Principles a Pamphlet proceeds upon, are such as would whave made all the *Jews* Schismatics, when the High Priest became Annual, and makes the *Greek* Church Schismatics, as often as the *Grand Seignior* changes their Patriarch. Now I have but one question to ask him, and it is in the instance before us, suppose *Athaliah* should have depos'd *Jehoiada*, and put another High Priest in his place, who were the *Jews* bound in Conscience to Communicate with? Or does he believe they would have deserted *Jehoiada*, and have joyn'd themselves any more to *Athaliah's* High Priest, than they did to *Athaliah* her self: when the Dr. gives me a clear answer to this, he shall hear more of my mind.

3. The Dr's Distinction is against

him. 'Tis true, God did entayle the Kingdom of *Judah* on the Family of *David*, and for that Reason they ought not to Submit to an Usurper, but this is so far from being a Reason, why they may Submit to one in other Kingdoms, where Entayles are made by Laws, that it is a Reason, and a very good one, why they ought not: For Gods entayling the Crown of *Judah*, was the Law of that Kingdom in that respect, and the People of other Kingdoms are as much bound to observe their own Laws, as the People of *Judah* were theirs. All Human Laws that are just, bind in Conscience, and (according to the Dr's own Principles) These Laws were made by God's Authority. So that the Dr. mistakes the Question; we do not oppose Human Laws to Gods Authority, but we oppose Laws, that are made by God's Authority, and which are a Rule to us, to Providence which is no Rule. When God entayl'd the Crown upon *David's* Posterity, they had then a Legal Right to it, and so hath every Family in other Kingdoms upon which an entayl is made by the Respective Laws of the Country. King *Charles* the Second had as good a Right to the Crown of *England*, as *Joash* had to that of *Judah*, and *Cromwells* Usurpation was no more a bar to him, nor gave *Cromwell* by his Possession of the Throne, any more Right to our Allegiance, than *Athaliah's* was against *Joash*; or than her Possession gave her a Right to the Allegiance of the People of *Judah*: God gave other Political Laws to his People, as well as this of Succession, but will any Man say therefore, that the Municipal Laws in other Countrys were not in all Respects as binding, to the Respective People. But to come nearer to our purpose: The Division of the Land of *Canaan* to the Twelve Tribes, was Expressly Comanded by G O D himself; and here we may try the full strength of the Dr's Argument. The Possession of

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of the Land of *Canaan*, to each Tribe and Family was allotted, and appointed by God's exprefs Command, but the Possessions in all other Countries, are only by his Providence. And therefore (according to the Dr's way of Reasoning) every Man that wrongfully possels'd himself of another Man's Estate in that Land, must be made to restore it; for God had exprefly given it to the other, and to his Family. But in all other Countries, if a Man by Providence, get his Neighbour's Estate, he must have it; for the Event is God's Act, and 'tis his evident Decree, and Council, that he should have it, and to deny it, *is to say that God as well as Men, is confin'd to humane Laws* in disposing of Estates. But now if this be false Reasoning, and such acts of Providence are no sign that it is God's Will he should have the Estate, but the Laws of the Land must take place notwithstanding; Then it is plain the Dr's Distinction is vain, and there is not that difference in this Respect, between the Laws that God himself makes, and those that are made by his Authority; for God gave the Estates of private Men to them and their Heirs, as exprefly as he did entail the Crown upon *David's* Family.

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There is one thing the Dr. asserts, which (if it were true) would overthrow all that is said, and therefore deserves to be considered; and that is, that *the Laws of the Land are the Rule of Conscience, when they do not contradict the Laws of God; but when they do, they are no Rules to us, but their Obligation must give place to a Divine Authority*: Thereby intimating that the Laws of God command us to pay all the Obedience of Subjects to Usurped Powers, and therefore we are bound to Obey them with respect to the Laws of God, though we are forbid so to do by the Laws of the Land. Now if the Dr. could prove this as strongly, as he affirms it, he hath

gain'd the Cause; for there is no dispute, but we must Obey the Laws of God, before those of Men! But where is this Law of God that commands us to Obey Usurpers? Where is it ever affirm'd in Scripture in exprefs Terms, or deduced from thence by evident Consequence? This Law had need be very clear and evident, and the Dr. had need be very sure of it, when he builds not only his Book, but his Practice upon it, in plain Contradiction (by his own Confession) to the Laws of the Land. He owns the Laws of the Land are the Rule of Conscience, and if those be clear and certain, and it be doubtful, and uncertain, whether the other be the Law of God or no, unbiass'd Conscience would soon determine the Case, that we are bound to follow that which is certain and plain, rather than that which is doubtful and obscure: Now that it is not clear, that there is such a Law of God, is evident, not only from the Controversies about it in the late dismal Times of Usurpation, but that no Learned Men could ever espy this Law, before the times of *John Goodwyn*, and the Dr. must have a great Opinion of his own Judgment, if he think that himself, *John Goodwyn*, and *Mr. Eaton*, can bear up the Authority of this Interpretation against all the World. The Dr. himself tells us with Respect to the Titles of Princes, That *these are great disputes among Learned Men; and how then should Unlearned Men understand them? And I cannot think* (saith he) *that the Resolution of Conscience in such matters as all Mankind are concern'd in, should depend upon such Niceties as Learned Men themselves cannot agree in.* And is not this the Case of the main Principle, and indeed the only material Argument in his whole Book? And it concludes more strongly against him; for the current Judgment of Learned Men is on the other side, and not many, if any Learned Man besides himself,

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himself, ever held there was such a Law, or concurred with him in his Interpretation of Scripture ; so that, if he could give a plausible Account of his own Interpretation, it would hardly be sufficient to warrant such a Book, or such a Practice, contrary to a plain and known Rule, and about which there is otherwise no Controversie. And this I take to be a sufficient Answer ; however, I shall briefly Consider what he urges from Scripture.

Pag. 11. Those Testimonies he Cites from the Old Testament, *That God giveth Kingdoms to whomsoever he will, that he removes Kings, and setteth up Kings, Dan. 4. 17. & 2. 21. 37.* These are certainly true, but nothing to his purpose ; for God did always set up, and remove Kings ; but this was no Evidence that God would have Usurpers Obey'd as Kings, as is evident in the Case of *Athaliah*. And God did as much remove Kings, and set up Kings in the Kingdom of *Judah*, as in any other Kingdom. And therefore it cannot from these Expressions be necessarily concluded, That every Person that gets Possession of the Throne, is a King, and ought to have the Duties belonging to a King, paid to him. But the truth is, the Doctor throughout his Book, begs the Question : He takes it for granted, That every Usurper is a King, when that is the Thing to be proved ; and he knows all Learned Men deny that an Usurper is a King, as *Athaliah* was no Queen, though she had got the Possession of the Throne ; And what is setting up Kings to an Usurper, who is no King. However, when Persons have Possession of the Throne who have a Legal Title, either by Descent, or other Acquisition, and who are Kings by the Consent of all Mankind, it is plain, that God sets them up. And it cannot necessarily be concluded, that any more is meant by God's setting up Kings. And if it cannot be necessarily concluded, then

here is not from thence any sufficient Warrant, to call every Usurper God's King, and to pay Duties to them accordingly ; as *Athaliah* was not God's Queen, though she had Possession of the Throne, and though God remov'd, and set up Kings then, as well as in any other Age.

His Testimony from the New Testament is, *Rom. 13. 1, 2. Let every Soul be Subject to the Higher Powers, Pag. 18. for all Power is of God, &c.* Now by

Powers (contrary to the current of all good Interpreters) the Dr. understands Usurped as well as Lawful Powers ; And his Reason is because the Scripture makes no distinction between Kings, and Usurpers. Now I had thought the Case of *Athaliah* had been a Distinction, and had this Precept been given in those days, I wonder whether any body would have doubted of whom it ought to be understood, whether of *Athaliah*, or *Joash*. But Pag. 19.

(saith the Dr.) *If the Apostle had intended such a Distinction, he ought to have said it in express words.* And why so I pray ? Does not the Nature of the thing sufficiently distinguish it ? And are there not general Rules about Right and Wrong, which extend to all Persons and Cases ? Does not the Doctor himself tell us, that St. Peter explains St. Paul, *Submit your selves to Case of the King (i. e.)* saith the Dr. in *St. Resist. Paul's Phrase to the Higher Powers ; P. 142.*

and is there any need in such Injunctions to distinguish between a King and no King ? The Apostle exhorts to Obey *them that have Rule over you*, mean- Heb. 13. ing the Minister of the Gospel ; now 17.

the Apostle makes no distinction between lawful Ministers, and Intruders ; and therefore if any Man can but get a Congregation, he must be the Person understood in this Precept, and the Dr. knows there has been as much Usurpation of the Ministry as ever was of Civil Government. In short, the Dr's Reason for his Interpretation is against

against him, There has ever been a Distinction in the World between Legal and Usurped Powers, and 'tis probable enough that St. Paul (who was so Learned a Man) knew it ; and if he had intended to enjoin Obedience to Usurped Powers, 'tis probable he would have said so in exprefs Terms ; but since he never said so, we have Reason to conclude he never intended it.

Pag. 34. 4. In Answer to the Authour, it is asserted above, That his Interpretation (and the same may be said of the Dr's.) justifies an unreasonable and impious Doctrine, by making the Acts or Permissions of Providence, a Rule for Practice, against Right and Justice. Something of this the Dr. takes notice of, and puts it into an Objection. *Have not Pyrates and Robbers as good a Title to my Purse, as an Usurper has to the Crown ? Does not the Providence of God order and dispose all these Events ?* To which the Dr. thus Answers ; *The Dispute is not about Humane and Legal Right in either Case, but about Authority ; Now no Man pretends that Thieves and Pyrates have God's Authority. I Answer ; What is this to the Purpose ? I know Thieves and Robbers have not God's Authority, neither hath an Usurper ; but have they not God's Providence as well as an Usurper ? And if Possession of Authority by Providence, gives a Right to it, Why does not the Possession of my Purse, by the same Providence, give a Right to it ?* The Dr. puts it into the Objection, *Have not Robbers as good a Title to my Purse, as an Usurper to the Crown ?* And it is certain they have as good a Title, for they have the very same. I grant, That taking a Purse, and taking Authority, are two Things, and so are also Usurpation and Right. But the Question is about Providence, and that is the same ; he that takes a Purse, takes it by Providence, as well as he that takes a Throne ; and if Providence gives a

Right, the one hath it as well as the other. But, *The Scripture* (saith the Dr.) *expresly tells us, that Kingdoms are dispos'd of God, that all Power is of God ;* and does not the same Scripture tell us, that the Earth is the Lord's, and the Fulness thereof, that he disposeth of it as he pleases, that when Job was robbed, he said, *The Lord hath taken away* : But if the Scripture had not said so, the Dr. says it ; for he tells us all Events are God's Act and Deed. And then it must follow, that the Possession of my Purse by a Thief, is as much God's Decree and Council, as the Possession of the Throne. The Dr. founds all this in God's Creation ; God, saith he, *is the Natural Lord of the World, because he made it, and* Pag. 15. *no Creature has any Right to Govern the World, or any part of it, but as he receives any Authority from God. And is not this the same in all other Respects ? Are not all Mens Estates God's as well as Authority ? And has any Man a Right to his Estate, but what God gives him ? And does it thence follow, that whatever any Man can get by Providence, though it be never so much against the Laws and common Right, it is his own, because God is not tied to Humane Laws, and hath a Right to the World by Creation, and may give it to whom he please. And I wonder what Reason there is, That 'tis a more certain Sign to us, that the Possession of Power by Providence, gives any more Right to it, than the Possession of Goods, or an Estate gives a Right to them.*

5. It is before asserted, That the Author's Interpretation reproaches the Virtue and Loyalty of these admirable Men that suffered between the Years 42 and 60. And the very same does the Dr's Interpretation, and all his Arguments : Now this the Dr. takes notice of, but says it is *only a Prejudice* Pag. 45. *but no Argument, nor can be formed into an Argument. And why not I pray ?*

8. pray? I had thought an Argument from Example had been an Argument, though not always a very good one. And yet (when it serves his Purpose) he can make use of a single Example, and that also very doubtful, as the Case of *Jaddus*. But the Example of so many Excellent Men, at once, and fresh in our Memories, and whose very Examples supported the Honour and Reputation of the Protestant Religion, when the Dr's Arguments, and the Practices consequent upon them, made it stink in the Nostrils of the World. And certainly such Examples as these, have their weight, and deserve from us, and all Protestants in the World, high Veneration. And it may justly move any Man's Indignation, to see the Worthies of the World, and of our Church, mock'd and diminish'd, and represented as Knaves or Fools, and all to support a mean and pitiful Argument, that has nothing in it. However the Dr. owns, that this is a Prejudice, and so it is, and a very considerable one: And I wonder what he hath said to remove it; not one Word to the purpose. He tells indeed of some differences, but not one that is any Difference as to the Matter before us, of Submission to Usurped Powers: I shall put them all together; because the Dr. says, *All together they will be more than Answer enough*; and yet I think all together, and as much more, will not make half an Answer. They are these *The great Villanies of those Days, bare-fac'd Rebellion, the Murder of one of the best of Princes, the barbarous Usage of the King's Friends, by Sequestration, Plunders, Imprisonments; Bishops, &c. turn'd out, the Loyal Clergy could not keep their Livings without renouncing the Church of England: The whole Government, and the Fundamental Constitution of the Nation was over-turn'd; And moreover, their Government was never settled, but frequently chang'd and*

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modell'd; and they had not a National Consent and Submission; for the Rump was not a Parliament, nor the Representatives of the Nation. Now the Dr. maintains, That Submission is due to Usurped Powers, by what ill Means soever they attain it: And that I think is Answer enough, That the *Villanies* he mentions, makes no Difference in his Argument: The barbarous Usage indeed, made some Difference in point of Interest, but none in point of Conscience; for if they were bound in Conscience to submit, they were so, notwithstanding such Usage (*Vid. Dr. Sherlock's Case of Resistance*): But the truth is, they met with such Usage, because they did not submit; if they would have submitted, and turn, and become Parties to the Government, they would have used them very kindly; and it may be, have restored their Estates and Livings. As to the *Bishops, Deans, and Clergy*, the Case is concerning Civil Government, not Ecclesiastical; and I do not find they were bound to abjure *Episcopacy*; and I hope the being disabled to keep a Living, especially if it be a good one, is not a sufficient Reason to Rebel. If that be the Case, King *William* had best take care to keep up the Rights of the Church, or else the Dr's Oath, and those of his Brethren, do not bind them. As to the overturning the Constitution, that is but changing the Form of Government, as the Dr. knows the Convocation says, *When such Degenerate Forms of Government are thoroughly settled*; and when the Dr. speaks of Usurped Powers in general, I suppose he does not mean it only of a King, but of a Government. These Usurpers had usurped the Power of the Lords and Commons, as well as of the King, but they were Usurpers still, and no more Usurpers in that than in the other, except the Dr. thinks, that they that Usurp upon the King, must be Obey'd; but they that

that usurp upon the Parliament, must not. But (saith the Dr.) the Government was not settled; if he could prove this, he might let all the rest alone; but why was it not settled? *Because it was frequently changed:* but every one of these Changes was a *Settlement*, if the Dr's Notion of a Settlement be right, and Cromwel was fully possessed of the Throne for Five Years, and more fully and quietly than the Present Government, all *Scotland* and *Ireland*, as well as *England*, was in his Hands. But as to the National Consent in Parliament, that is indeed part of our Constitution, but what is that to Usurpation, which may usurp as well upon all Branches of the Constitution as upon one. The Dr. tells us, that Legal Rights is not in the Question, God is above Law, and to whom he gives Authority, must be obeyed, and the Possession of it is an Evidence that he gives it. And if Cromwel possessed the Authority of *Kings, Lords* and *Commons*, why then he had God's Authority in all these Respects, and ought to have been obeyed. And let any Man read the Dr's Notion of a Settlement, (and he tells us he despairs of ever seeing another) and try if it will not fit Cromwel in all Respects, just as if it had been made for him.

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But there is one thing more yet behind, and that is an Argument from Interest; and that I suppose is not much better than an Argument from Example: *In the Late Times* (saith he) *of Rebellion, all the Friends of Monarchy, &c. were bound in Interest to take all Opportunities to restore the King;* but were they not bound in Conscience to the contrary? If they were not, all the Dr's Arguments are nothing; if they were, then he has given a very Honourable Character of these excellent Men, that they preferred their Interest to their Con-

sciences, which if any man can believe, then I will engage to believe all the Arguments in the Doctor's Book.

Before I end this, I shall offer the Dr. one Argument, and it is this: If Possession of Sovereign Power, contrary to Law, be God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed, then whatever Sovereign Power a Prince possesses himself of, is likewise God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed: For, the formal Reason of Obedience to such a Prince is, because he hath God's Authority; and the Evidence that he hath that Authority, is, because he is possessed of Sovereign Power. And therefore, so far as a Prince can possess himself of Sovereign Power, so far he hath God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed. Now I take it for granted, and the Dr. will not deny it, That to be Absolute and Arbitrary is not inconsistent with the notion of Sovereign Power: If therefore a Prince in a limited Monarchy, resolves to be Arbitrary, (which the Dr. grants may very easily be, when he has all the Power of the Kingdom in his Hands, and must not be resisted) to make his Will the Law, and to exercise an illegal Power, he must be obeyed, as God's Authority, whatsoever the Laws of the Land say to the contrary. For, the Dr. tells us, *That when the Laws of the Land contradict the Laws of God, they are no Rule to us, but their Obligation must give place to Divine Authority:* i.e. When God gives a Man Authority; and that is (according to him) when he is by Providence possessed of it, he must be obeyed, notwithstanding any Injunction of Human Laws. So that if a Judge swear to administer Justice according to the Laws, or, if he does not swear, he is obliged to it; yet if the King command him to give Sentence without Trial, or forms of Law

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he is bound to do it, for the Obligation he has to the Laws must give place to the Authority of God, which the King is possessed of. And then, alas! what will become of us, who refus'd to read the *Declaration*, and the Gentlemen of *Magdalen College*? we thought the Laws were our Rule, and they their Statutes, and so it seems they were; but if they contradicted the Authority of God as they did, if they contradicted the Power the King was possessed of, their Obligation ceased. Now, I suppose, no body at that time disputed K. 3's Power, if he had only commanded them to chuse another President contrary to their Statutes and their Oaths, and had not been able to *Crush them*, if they refused, (the Dr's Characteristick of a Settlement in the Possession of Power) then the Statutes were their Rule, and they were bound in Conscience to observe them; but if he were able to *Crush them*, (as what he actually did he was certainly able to do) then their Obligation was to give place to the Authority of God, manifested by Possession of Power, and they were bound in Conscience to observe his Command, contrary to their Statutes and Oaths, in obedience to God's Authority, which is superior to them.

Now, this is a pretty plain Case; and if the Dr's Arguments be good, then we our selves, and the Fellows of *Magdalen College*, upon pretence of obeying the Laws, have only been disobeying God's Authority; for the assuming an *Illegal Power* is no more against the Laws, than *Illegal* and *Usurped Powers*; and God, when he gives Authority, is confined to our Laws and Constitution no more, in the extent of Power, than in the Person; and the only Evidence that we have, that God gives it, is Possession of it by Providence; and

whatsoever Power a Prince is possessed of, hath the same Evidence, and consequently is a Branch of the same Authority. And *Arbitrary Power* is not inconsistent with the notion of *Sovereign Power*, and whatever Limitations of *Government* there are now in the World, they are only Limitations made by Human Laws, and of no force against God's Authority: That is, in short, there can be nothing said to justify Obedience to a Possessor of the Throne contrary to Law, but what is of equal force to justify Obedience to the exercise or acts of *Illegal Power*, contrary to Law; and the Conscience is as much obliged to one as to the other; and that is, That it is not the Laws of the Land, but the Power of the Prince, which is the Rule of Conscience. And here is the plain Question; Had the Gentlemen of *Magdalen College* complied with the Will and Power of the King, contrary to their Statutes and their Oaths, had they in so doing been perjured? if they had, then the Laws are to be a Rule, contrary to the Possession of Power, let that Possession have never so much Providential Evidence of God's Authority, and let the Person so possessed be never so able to *Crush them* for Refusal. But then it will follow, that all the Dr's Arguments of Possession by Providence, contrary to Laws, will really signifie very little: for, How comes an Oath to Local Statutes to be of more force than an Oath of Allegiance? and, I would fain see a Reason, why the Laws of a private College should oblige the Members of that Society, more than the Laws of a Kingdom should oblige the Subjects of that Kingdom. If it be said, That though the King exercised an *Illegal Power*, yet he has not thoroughly settled in the possession of it, because he had not a National Consent to it: I say so too, but then I say likewise,

wife, that an illegal Power is not thoroughly settled, nor does bind the Subject to obedience, till it becomes Legal; for a National Consent, may part with the Rights of a Nation, as well as the Consent of a Prince may part with his own Rights. And then it follows, that Possession of Power, though there be Providence, and an Army in the case, is not a Rule for Obedience to it, as to the Authority of God, but only the Legality of Power.

Pag. 3. And thus I have examined all that the Dr. offers from the Convocation Book, and incidentally the main Principles and Arguments of his Book: And if what I have said, be True, with Respect to the Convocation, then I have answer'd his whole Book, by his own Confession: for he tells us, *That I may not appear to be singular, and to advance Paradoxes, I shall prove it from the Doctrines and Principles of the Church of England.* But then, if he hath not prov'd it from the Doctrines of the Church of England, as he hath not, if he have not prov'd it from the Convocation, then by his own Confession he is singular, and advances Paradoxes; and I hope Paradoxes do not need to be answered, let People that write them, challenge as much as they please: And as for Singularity, I confess he has some Company, but such, as he hath no great need to be proud of; *John Goodwyn, and Eaton, and Three or Four more such as They, have maintain'd the very same; and he might as well have challenged us to Answer them, and it had been to as much Purpose; for they have the very same Arguments.* But one would have thought amongst Men of the Church of England, the very Naming them, would have been Answering them. But for any other in any Age, I believe it would be hard to find any single judicious Man, who has ever own'd His Principles, or Sense of Scripture, and any man that hath ever

heard of this Distinction, *Tyrannus sine Titulo, & Tyrannus exercitio*, is able to discover the Novelty of the Dr's Principles; and that he does nothing but maintain Paradoxes, if to maintain Opinions contrary to the general Sense of Mankind, be to maintain Paradoxes.

I shall conclude with the Dr. as I did with the Author, with a Quotation to Confirm what I have said, and with a Request to him;

First, My Quotation shall be out of Dr. Sherlock's Case of Resistance, Pag. 127. & Seq.

Is the Power of Victorious Rebels and Usurpers from God? Did OLIVER CROMWEL receive his Power from God, then it seems it was unlawful to Resist him too, or to Conspire against him: Then all those Loyal Subjects, who refused to submit to him, when he had got the POWER into his Hands, were Rebels and Traitors?

To this I Answer:

That the most prosperous Rebel is not the Higher Powers, while the NATURAL PRINCE, to whom we owe Obedience and Subjection is in being: And therefore, tho such Men may get the Power into their hands by God's Permission, yet not by God's Ordinance; and he who resists them, does not Resist the Ordinance of God, but the Usurpations of Men. In Hereditary

tary Kingdoms, the King never dies, but the same Minute that the Natural Person of one King dies, the Crown descends upon the next of Blood, and therefore, he who Rebelleth against the Father, and Murders him, continues a Rebel in the Reign of the Son, which Commences with his Fathers Death.

Now the Dr. may say perhaps, that he has renounced this: But it may be true enough, for all that, and so it is for any thing he hath said to the contrary in his New Book; But to satisfie him, I do not quote it for his Authority; for whatever his Honesty is, his Authority is not so much, and I suppose he does not expect it: But I cite it, because it is true, and is a plain declaration of the sence of the Church of England, at that time; for this Passage was never yet question'd, 'till he

hath now done it himself. And I believe, should any man at that time, have but ask'd him the Question, concerning his present Opinions and Practices, he would have returned such an answer, as Hazael gave to Elisha, when he Prophetically told him of those things, which he afterwards actually did, *Is thy servant a Dog, that he should do this great thing!* But Hazael afterwards changed his mind, and so has the Dr. 2 Kings 8. 13.

2.^d My Request to him is, that, when he next publishes a Book, he will not put such an Assertion in the Preface: *Tho I refused the Oaths, I never engaged in any Faction against it: I never made it my business to dissuade men from it, &c.* For Never is a very long time, and some body, or other, may chance to remember, and take notice of it; and when they see such a bold Assertion in the Preface, they may be apt to suspect, that all the Book is the same piece.

F I N I S.

L O N D O N,

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